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A SIMPLE DECLARATIVE LANGUAGE FOR DESCRIBING 
NARRATIVES WITH ACTIONS 
ANTONIOS KAKAS AND ROB MILLER 
I> We describe a simple declarative language ~ for describing the effects of a 
series of action occurrences within a narrative. ~ is analogous to Gelfond 
and Lifschitz's Language ~¢ and its extensions, but is based on a different 
ontology. The semantics of ~ is based on a simple characterisation of
persistence which facilitates a modular approach to extending the expres- 
sivity of the language. Domain descriptions in d can be translated to 
equivalent theories in ~. We show how, in the context of reasoning about 
actions, ~'s  narrative-based ontology may be exploited in order to charac- 
terise and synthesise two complementary notions of explanation. Accord- 
ing to the first notion, explanation may be partly modelled as the process 
of suitably extending an apparently inconsistent theory written in ~" so as 
to establish consistency, thus providing a natural method, in many cases, to 
account for conflicting sets of information about the domain. According to 
the second notion, observations made at later times can sometimes be 
explained in terms of what is true at earlier times. This enables domains to 
be given an alternative characterisation in which knowledge arising from 
observations i appropriately separated from other aspects of the domain. 
We also describe how ~ domains may be implemented as Event Calculus 
style logic programs, which facilitate automated reasoning both backwards 
and forwards in time, and which behave correctly even when the knowl- 
edge entailed by the domain description is incomplete. © Elsevier Sci- 
ence Inc., 1997 <1 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper largely concerns narrative reasoning, that is, reasoning about actions 
which actually occur at various times, and reasoning about the properties that hold 
or do not hold at different times as a consequence of such occurrences. The 
importance of narrative reasoning has been recognized elsewhere (see [2], [34], or 
[31]). For example, to deal with observations a formalism must allow the represen- 
tation of a narrative, since phenomena can only be "observed" at actual times. In 
the context of the Situation Calculus it makes little sense to state that Fred is 
observed to be alive in the "hypothetical" or "projected" situation 
Result( Shoot, Result( Wait, Result( Load, SO)) ) 
unless there is some extra mechanism to relate the sequence of actions Load- 
Wait-Shoot o the time a which the observation took place. 
For the purposes of discussion, we will informally define a narratiue-based 
formalism as a formalism in which the structure or flow of time is represented 
independently from the notion of an action, and in which actions are "embedded" 
in this independent structure using an explicit notion of an action occurrence. 
Examples of such formalisms are Allen's interval-based approach [1], Sandewall's 
Features and Fluents framework [36] (where a series of action occurrences are 
captured as a schedule) and Kowalski and Sergot's Event Calculus [24]. On the 
other hand, formalisms such as McCarthy and Hayes' Situation Calculus [29], 
Dynamic Logics (see for example [18]) and Gelfond and Lifschitz's Language ~¢ 
[16] are not narrative-based. This is not to say that they cannot be extended to deal 
with narrative information (see for example [34], [31], or [26]). But the notions of an 
independent flow of time and of an action occurrence are not central to their 
underlying ontology. 
In [16] and [17], Gelfond and Lifschitz proposed a particular methodology for 
research into reasoning about action. The authors introduced the Language d as a 
"simple declarative language for describing actions," and suggested that, by de- 
scribing general translation procedures from ~¢" domains into other formalisms, an 
insight could be gained into the comparative possibilities and limitations of each 
approach. The success of this idea is exemplified in a paper of Kartha [21], which 
uses translations from ~" to show the equivalence of three well-known characteri- 
sations of the Situation Calculus for a whole class of domains. The primary 
intention of ~ was to provide a language and semantics imple enough to be 
regarded as uncontroversial nd intuitive, even if (initially) somewhat limited in 
expressivity. Of course, the "neutrality" of any such language, used as a measuring 
stick for other formalisms, will inevitably be compromised to some extent by the 
necessity of choosing a particular ontology as a starting point. The ontology 
underlying the Language ~ is inherited from the Situation Calculus. 
This paper shows that the methodology described above need not be limited to 
this particular ontology. Our central aim is to propose and develop a simple 
declarative language for describing narratives, called g', based not upon the 
ontology of the Situation Calculus, but instead upon a narrative-based ontology 
similar to that of the Event Calculus. Furthermore, we aim to use ~ as a 
specification for developing logic programs for automated reasoning about action 
and change in a principled manner. We believe that the use of, and comparison 
between, different ontologies is vital in the study of reasoning about action. Central 
issues such as the frame problem, the ramification problem and the qualification 
problem all take on different flavours when set in different ontological contexts. 
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Comparisons between approaches can help reveal which aspects of these problems 
are fundamental, and which are merely the product of a particular method of 
representation. 
In particular, the notion of persistence (or "inertia") is somewhat different in a 
narrative setting. A simple declarative characterisation f persistence is central to 
the semantics of ~ described below. This semantics, like that of m', is model-theo- 
retic, and the characterisation of persistence is achieved by listing three specific 
conditions which each model must satisfy. The definition of a model is intended to 
be modular in the sense that, in future extensions to 8 ~, further conditions or 
constraints not relating to persistence may simply be added. (To illustrate this 
point, two simple extensions to ~ are given in an appendix.) The semantics gives 
rise to a notion of entailment which is independent from any particular method of 
derivation or computation. Thus the Language ~ helps differentiate between the 
ontological commitments of the Event Calculus and the computational mechanisms 
provided by its original logic programming setting. In this respect it serves a 
purpose similar to that of the formalisms described in [40], [41], and [7]. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic syntax and 
semantics of ~, give some examples and discuss some general properties of the 
formalism. In Section 3 we show a correspondence b tween the Languages m" and 
by describing a sound and complete translation from theories written in d into 
Language ~ domain descriptions. We also briefly discuss the relationship between 
and the Language ~0, a narrative extension of m" recently proposed by Baral, 
Gelfond, and Provetti [5], [6]. In the next three sections, we use 8 ~ to characterise 
two complementary notions of explanation in temporal domains. In Section 4, we 
show how explanation may be partly modelled as the process of extending an 
apparently inconsistent heory written in ~ so as to establish consistency. In 
particular, we show that the syntax and semantics of ~ allows a class of 
"narrative-based" explanations to be identified in a natural way. We also show how 
different preference relations between explanations can be combined with the 
simple object-level definition of entailment described previously in order to define 
a meta-level semantics with both an abductive and a deductive flavour. In Sections 
5 and 6 we show that observations made at later times may also sometimes be 
explained in terms of what is true at earlier times. To do this, we identify a special 
class of ~ domain descriptions, and separate out observations from these theories. 
In Section 7 we describe how 8 ~ domains may be implemented as Event Calculus 
style logic programs. We do this in a way which avoids potential problems when the 
information entailed by the domain is "incomplete," which could otherwise be 
caused by logic programming's implicit completion of the HoldsAt predicate. These 
programs also encode a limited form of reasoning backwards in time. Finally, in 
Section 8 we show how, for a particular class of domains, we may use some of the 
notions of explanation developed earlier to add a meta-level component to these 
implementations, in order to facilitate a more "complete" form of automated 
temporal reasoning. 
2. A CLASS OF LANGUAGES FOR DESCRIBING NARRATIVES OF 
ACTION OCCURRENCES 
First, we will describe the basic syntax of the Language ~. Strictly speaking, 
represents a family of languages, all of which use a basic ontology and vocabulary 
of fluents (properties), actions and time points. The progression of time is repre- 
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sented by an ordering relation over the set of  time points. Time may either be 
continuous of progress via discrete steps, and need not necessarily be linear. 
Definition 2.1 [Domain Language]. A domain language is a tuple ( I  I ,  ~ ,  A, ~) ,  
where ~ is a partial (possibly total) ordering 1defined over the non-empty set I I  
of time points, A is a non-empty set of action constants, and dO is a non-empty 
set of  fluent constants. 
Except where the context implies otherwise, for the remainder of  the paper we 
assume a particular domain language g~ = ( I  I ,  ~ ,  A ,~) .  We will often write 
T I<T  z to meanT I~T  2 andT  14 :T  2. 
Definition 2.2 [Fluent literal]. A fluent literal of ~ is an expression either of  the 
form F or of  the form ~ F, where F ~ ~.  
Three types of statements are possible within g'. C-propositions ("c" for "causes") 
express the conditions under which particular actions can potentially initiate or 
terminate periods (i.e., intervals) in which a property holds. H-propositions ("h" for 
"happens")  indicate that a particular action occurs at a particular time, and 
t-propositions ("t" for "t ime point") express that a particular property holds at a 
particular time. 
Definition 2.3 [c-proposition]. A c-proposition in ~ is an expression either of the 
form 
A initiates F when C 
or of the form 
A terminates F when C 
where F ~ alp, A ~ A, and C is a set of fluent literals of ~. 
Notation. We shall often write c-propositions of the form "A initiates F when 
•" and "A  terminates F when Q" as "A initiates F"  and "A terminates F" 
respectively. 
Definition 2.4 [h-proposition]. An h-proposition in g" is an expression of the form 
A happens-at T 
where A~A andT~H.  
Definition 2.5 [t-proposition]. A t-proposition in ~ is an expression of the form 
L holds-at T 
where L is fluent literal of ~ and T ~ II. 
~We mean "partial ordering" in the usual mathematical sense, i.e., ~ is reflexive, transitive an 
antisymmetric. ~ should not be regarded as representing partial knowledge about a total order--our 
formalism would have to be modified to cope with this type of incomplete information. Although it 
might be argued that time is in fact linear, so that ~ should always be a total ordering, we consider 
partial orderings here for the sake of mathematical generality, and because in Section 3 a particular 
partially ordered set is useful in showing a correspondence b tween the Languages ~ and ~. 
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Definition 2.6 [Domain description]. A domain description in g" is a tr iple (3', 77, T), 
where 3, is a set of  c-proposit ions, 77 is a set of h-proposit ions,  z and r is a set of 
t -proposit ions in g'. 
The semantics for g" is expressed by defining the not ion of an interpretation, and 
stating when an interpretat ion qualifies as a model  for a given domain description. 
In the definit ions below, an interpretat ion is def ined simply as a mapping of 
f luent / t ime-po in t  pairs to true or false (i.e., a holds relation). A model  is an 
interpretat ion that respects four propert ies.  The first three of  these are intended to 
character ise a "commonsense"  not ion about the persistence of propert ies  as t ime 
progresses. In part icular,  they encapsulate the idea that all points at which a 
property  starts (ceases) to hold are earmarked by an initiating (terminat ing) action 
occur rence- - in  other  words, actions are the only mechanisms for change. 3 This is 
stated explicitly in condit ion (1) of Def init ion 2.10. Condit ions (2) and (3) confirm 
that the terms initiate and terminate have their  intended meanings, relative to this 
"commonsense"  principle. 
Definition 2. 7 [ Interpretat ion].  An  interpretation of ~ is a mapping 
H: • × El ~ {true, false}. 
Definition 2.8 [Point satisfaction]. Given a set of  f luent l iterals C of  g" and a t ime 
point  T ~ H, an interpretat ion H satisfies C at T i f f  for each fluent constant 
F ~ C, H(F, T) = true, and for each fluent constant F '  such that ~ F '  ~ C, 
H(F', T) =false. 
Definition 2.9 [ In i t ia t ion / terminat ion  point]. Let H be an interpretat ion of g', let 
D=(3 , , r / ,~- )  be a domain  descript ion, let F~qb and let T~I I .  T is an 
initiation-point (respectively termination-point) for F in H relative to D iff there is 
an A ~ A such that (i) there is both an h-proposit ion in 77 of  the form "A 
happens-at  T"  and a c-proposit ion in 3, of the form "A  init iates F when C"  
(respectively "A  terminates  F when C")  and (ii) H satisfies C at T. 4 
Definition 2.10 [Model]. Given a domain  descr ipt ion D = (3', r/, z )  in g', an inter- 
pretat ion H of  g" is a model of D iff, for every F ~ • and T, T', T 1, T 3 ~ H such 
that T 1 -< T 3, the following propert ies  hold: 
1. If  there is no init iat ion-point or  terminat ion-point  T z for F in H relative to 
D such that T 1 ~ T 2 -< T3, then H(F ,T  1) =H(F ,  T3). 
z Thus, since r t can include more than one h-proposition that refers to the same time point, g" allows 
for a limited form of concurrency (its semantics forces the assumption that concurrently performed 
actions do not interfere, for example to cancel each other's effects). In contrast .~¢ does not allow any 
concurrency, whereas its extension ~ [4] allows for a more general form of concurrency. 
3 This principle might be considered too strong for some domains, e.g., those involving continuous 
change. In this case, some distinction will be required between those properties which naturally persist 
(frame fluents in Lifschitz's terminology) and those which do not. 
4 . . . . . . . . . . . .  According to thts definmon, not all initiation and termination points will be points of change of the 
fluent within a particular model. For example, if a fluent already holds before an initiation-point it will 
remain unchanged. Thus in Sergot's terms [37] the semantics uses "weak" initiation and termination 
(but see footnote, Appendix A.1), 
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2. If T 1 is an initiation-point for F in H relative to D, and there is no 
termination-point T 2 for F in H relative to D such that T l -< T 2 -< T 3, then 
H(F, T 3) -- true. 
3. If T 1 is a termination-point for F in H relative to D, and there is no 
initiation-point T2 for F in H relative to D such that T 1 -< T 2 ~ 773, then 
H( F, T 3) =false. 
4. For all t-proposition i  z of the form "F holds-at T", H(F, T) = true, and for 
all t-propositions of the form "~ F holds-at T'", H(F, T') =false. 
Definition 2.11 [Consistency]. A domain description is consistent iff it has a model. 
Definition 2.12 [Entailment]. A domain description D entails the t-proposition "F 
hold-at T", written "D ~ F holds-at T", iff for every model H of D, H(F, T) = 
true. D entails the t-proposition "~ F holds-at T" iff for every model H of D, 
H(F, T) =false. 
In keeping with our adopted methodology, two important simplifying assump- 
tions are implicitly included in the above semantics. First, the information about 
the general effects of actions, expressed as c-propositions, is assumed to be 
complete. An analogous assumption is made about the e-propositions in a Lan- 
guage ~¢ theory. Second, the information about the occurrence of actions, ex- 
pressed as h-propositions, is also assumed to be complete. (There is no directly 
analogous assumption i  the definition of a Language 5g model, since the notion of 
an action occurrence is not included in its ontology.) Clearly, both these assump- 
tions will be sources of nonmonotonicity in the language. The h-propositions not 
only give complete information about which actions occur, but (since ~ is assumed 
to be well-defined) also give complete information about the order and timing of 
these occurrences. 5 
Condition (4) in Definition 2.10 above expresses pointwise constraints on a 
model which arise from the inclusion of t-propositions in the domain description. 
We envisage other such constraints being added in future, more expressive xten- 
sions of ~. Such extensions might also require refinements to the definitions of an 
interpretation or of an initiation or termination point. But we expect o characteri- 
sation of persistence ncapsulated in conditions (1)-(3), which can be regarded as 
the "core" of the semantics, to remain unaltered. To remain faithful to the 
methodology we are using, we wish here to keep the syntax and semantics of ~ as 
simple as possible, even at the loss of some expressivity. However, to illustrate this 
modular aspect of the semantics we have included two simple extensions of ~ in 
Appendix A (relating to "qualifications" and "ramifications" of action occurrences). 
The following two examples illustrate the effects of our model-theoretic charac- 
terisation of persistence. 
5 Relaxing these assumptions would be an interesting area for future research, but would inevitably 
lead to a more complex semantics. For example, it would be straightforward to allow for incomplete 
knowledge about he order and timing of action occurrences byusing temporal variables in h-proposi- 
tions, and including afourth type of proposition i domain descriptions with which to express ordering 
constraints between these variables. An interpretation would then include a mapping (i.e., variable 
assignment) from temporal variables to time points as a second component. 
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Example 2.1. This example is intended to illustrate to necessity of including the 
first condition in Definition 2.10 of a Language ~ model above. It concerns 
vaccinations against a particular disease. Vaccine A only provides protection for 
people with blood type O, and vaccine B only works on people with blood type 
other than O. Fred's blood type is not known, so he is injected with vaccine A at 2 
o'clock and vaccine B at 3 o'clock. For simplicity we will model time as the real 
number line with the usual ordering relation, so that for this example, ~, = (~l, 
< ,{InjectA, InjectB},{Protected, TypeO}). The domain description D v consists of 
two c-propositions, two h-propositions and a single t-proposition: 
InjectA initiates Protected when { TypeO} 
InjectB initiates Protected when { -7 TypeO} 
InjectA happens-at 2 
InjectB happens-at 3 
Protected holds-at 1. 
If we now consider some time later than 3 o'clock, say 4 o'clock, we can see 
intuitively that Fred should be protected. Now by condition (1), in all models of D L, 
Fred's blood group remains constant, so that in any given model, by condition (2), 
Fred becomes protected either at 2 o'clock or at 3 o'clock. Consequently, 
D~. ~ Protected holds-at 4. 
Had condition (1) not been included in the definition of a model, it would have 
been possible to construct a model, for example, in which Fred's blood type 
"mysteriously" changed from ~ TypeO to TypeO at 2.30, thus rendering both 
vaccinations ineffective. 
Example 2.2. This example shows tbat the Language ~ can be used to infer 
information about what conditions hold at the time of an action occurrence, given 
other information about what held at times before and afterwards. It is similar 
to Baker's "murder mystery" scenario [3]. Let g~ys=(~ +, <,{Shoot},{Alive, 
Loaded}), where ~+ signifies the non-negative real numbers, and let the domain 
description Dr s consist of a single c-proposition, a single h-proposition and two 
t-propositions: 
Shoot terminates Alive when { Loaded} 
Shoot happens-at 2 
Alive holds-at 1 
Alive holds-at 3. 
Since by condition (4) in any model H of Dy s, H(Alive, 1)¢H(Al ive,3) ,  then by 
condition (1), in all models an action must occur at some time point between 1 and 
3 whose initiating or terminating conditions for the property Alive are satisfied at 
that point. The only candidate is the Shoot occurrence at 2, whose condition for 
terminating Alive is Loaded. Hence 
Dy s ~ Loaded holds-at 2. 
Indeed, by applying condition (1) again, it is easy to see that for all n, n >_ 0, 
Dys ~ Loaded holds-at n. 
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Two properties of g" will prove useful later. The first is that ~ is monotonic as 
regards addition of t-propositions to domain theories (although, as observed 
earlier, not as regards addition of h-propositions or c-propositions). That is to say, 
if H is a model of a domain description ( T, 77, ~) and ~-' ___ 7, H is also a model of 
(y,r/ ,~-').  This follows directly from Definition 2.10. The second property of 
interest concerns the deterministic nature of actions' effects within a narrative, and 
is somewhat analogous to Lin and Shoham's notion of epistemological completeness 
[27]. Provided the domain description under consideration is consistent and con- 
tains no finite intervals of time in which an infinite number of actions occur, then 
the set of fluents which hold at any point T completely determines the set of 
fluents which hold at any later time point. This claim is made precise in the 
following definition and proposition. 
Definition 2.13 [Occurrence Sparsity]. Let D = (y ,  7/, ~-) be a domain description 
written in a language g" = ( I I ,  ~ ,  A, • >. D and r/ are occurrence-sparse iff for 
any two points T 1, T 2 ~ II there are only a finite number of h-propositions in ~7 
of the form "A happens-at T"  such that T 1 ~ T < T 2. 
Proposition 2.1. Let D be an occurrence-sparse domain description written in a 
language ~ = ( II, ~ , A, ~ ) , and let T I, T 2 ~ 1I be such that T a ~ T 2. Let H and 
H'  be models of D such that for all F ~ ~,  H(F,  T I) = H' (F ,  T1). Then for all 
F ~ ~, H(F ,  T 2) = H'(F,  T2). 
PROOF. See Appendix B.1. [] 
The occurrence of infinite numbers of actions in a finite period of time leads to 
interesting and/or  unexpected results in many formalisms for reasoning about 
action. For a general discussion of this complex issue, the reader may refer to 
Davis [9]. However, for the remainder of this paper, we restrict our attention to 
domain descriptions which are occurrence-sparse, and thus deterministic in the 
sense of Proposition 2.1. 
3. SIMULATING THE LANGUAGE ~ AS A CLASS OF LANGUAGE 
g" DOMAINS 
Because they use different ontologies, any correspondence b tween the Languages 
and ff must inevitably be expressed in rather artificial terms. In this section we 
show that Language ~¢ domains can be simulated or re-formulated as Language 
domains with a branching structure <I , ~ > of time points, analogous to the 
branching "tree" of situations often incorporated in formulations of the Situation 
Calculus. Since the Language ~" is not narrative-based and so does not directly 
include the notion of action occurrences, in our reformulation an appropriate 
action occurrence has to be "built in" at each point in this tree structure. In 
situation calculus terms, we must ensure that for each situation S in the tree, the 
action A "occurs" between the situations S and Result(A, S). To express this, we 
need to insert an extra time-point between S and Result( A,  S ) - - in  graphical 
terms, we need to be able to refer to the arcs connecting he situation nodes in the 
tree. This is achieved in a simple way below by considering "doubled" sequences of 
actions. Sequences of even length correspond to nodes of the tree structure (i.e., to 
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situations), and sequences of odd length correspond to the inter-connecting arcs. A 
temporal ordering relation is then defined on both nodes and arcs. 
Definition 3.1 [A-sequence[. Given a set A of action constants, a A-sequence of A is 
defined inductively as follows: 
• The empty sequence ( ( ) )  is a A-sequence. 
• For each A ,A '~A,  the singleton sequence (([A[)),  the sequence 
((IA[, A ) )  and the sequence (([A[, A, IA'I)) are all A-sequences. 
• For each A 1 . . . . .  An ~ A,((IA1],A1 . . . . .  IAnI, A.)) is a A-sequence. 
• For each A '~A and for each A-sequence (([AII, A 1 . . . . .  IAnl, An)) ,  
(([AI[, A x . . . .  , ]A,I, A n, IA'I)) is a A-sequence. 
Definition 3.2 [A-ordering[. Given a set of A of action constants and the corre- 
sponding set H a of all A-sequences, the A-ordering <a over H a is defined as 
follows 
• For all S~H a , ( (  ) )<aS.  
• For all ( (a  1 . . . . .  an))  ~ H a and for all m such that 1 <m <n,  
( (~1 . . . .  ,am)) -<a( (a l  . . . . .  ~ . ) ) .  
Examples. Suppose A = {Wait, Load, Shoot}. The A-sequence 
(( ILoadl, Load, IWaitl, Wait, [Shootl, Shoot)) 
corresponds to the Situation Calculus term 
Result( Shoot, Result( Wait, Result( Load, SO) ) ) 
and (regarding situations as arranged in a branching tree structure) the A-sequence 
(( ]Load], Load, [Wait[, Wait, [Shoot[)) 
corresponds to the inter-connecting arc between the situations 
Result( Wait, Result( Load, SO)) 
and 
Result( Shoot, Result(Wait, Result( Load, SO)) ). 
Regarding the ordering <a,  it is easy to see that, for example, 
(([Loadl)) <A (([Loadl, Load)) 
( ( [ Load[, Load)) <a ( ([Load[, Load, [Wait I,Wait, ]Shoot], Shoot)) 
Notation. We shall sometimes refer to the A-sequence 
( ( [A l l ,  A 1 . . . . .  [A.I, An)) 
simply as A 1 . . . . .  A n and refer to the A-sequence 
((IA~[, A, . . . .  , IAn[, An, IA'I)) 
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as A~ . . . . .  A n, IA'I. Not ice that in this notat ion 
At,.. . ,  A n , IA'I -<a A~ ..... A , ,  A'. 
The next definit ion allows us to express that, in general,  the action A' occurs at 
A 1 . . . . .  A n, I A'], so that the effects of A'  are apparent  at the following t ime point 
A 1 . . . . .  An, A'. 
Definition 3.3 [Complete occurrence set]. Let ~ = (Ha,  <a,  A ,~) ,  where H a is the 
set of A-sequences of  A and <a is the A-order ing over H a. The set r/a, called 
the complete occurrence set of A, is the set of all h-proposit ions of  ~ either of 
the form 
A happens-at  ( ( IA [ ) )  
or of  the form 
A n happens-at  ( ( IA I [ ,  A 1 . . . . .  IAn l I, A._ 1, IA~[)) .  
The following proposit ion shows a sense in which the Language ~:  may be 
regarded as a special case of the Language ~.  
Proposition 3.1. Let D A be a consistent theory written in a language d in the sense of  
[16], with a set o f  action constants A and a set o f  fluent constants @. Let 
~= (HA, <a ,A,~P),  where H a is the set of  A-sequences of  A and < a is the 
A-ordering over H a. Let D E be the domain description ( y, rla, z )  in ~ defined as 
follows: 
• ~Ta is the complete occurrence set o f  A 
• For each v-proposition in D A of  the form "L  after A i ; . . .  ;Am" there is a 
t-proposition in r o f  the form "L  holds-at  A 1 . . . . .  Am," and for each 
v-proposition in D A of  the form " init ial ly L"  there is a t-proposition in z of  
the form "L  holds-at ( ( ) ) . "  
• For each F ~ ~P, then for each e-proposition in D A of  the form "A  causes F 
i f  L 1 . . . . .  Ln" there is a c-proposition in y of  the form "A  init iates F when 
{L 1 . . . . .  L .}."  
• For each F ~ dp, then for each e-proposition in D A of  the form "A  causes 
-~ F if L1, . . . ,  Ln" there is a c-proposition in y o f  the form "A  terminates F 
when {L 1 . . . . .  Ln}." 
Then for each F ~ dp and each A 1 . . . . .  A n ~ A 
• D E ~ F holds-at ( ( ) )  if and only if D A entails init ial ly F 
• D E ~ ~ F holds-at ( ( ) )  if and only i fD  A entails init ial ly -~ F 
• D E ~F  holds-at A 1 . . . . .  A n if and only i fD  A entails F after A I ; . . . ;A ,  
• D E ~ -~ F holds-at  A 1 . . . . .  A n if and only i fD  A entails -7 F after A1; . . .  ;A , .  
PROOF. Let  R be the unique transit ion function such that there is a model  (o- 0, R) 
of  D A (for definit ions see [16]). Let ~r_c ~ be a set of f luent constants. For  each 
F ~ ~P and A l . . . . .  A n, A' ~ A let the interpretat ion H[~,R 1 be def ined as follows: 
• H[~,R] (F , ( ( ) ) )  =H[~,R](F , ( ( IA ' [ ) ) )  =true if and only if F~ o- 
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• Ht~,R I (F , ( ( IA I I ,  A l . . . . .  [A,I, An)))  
= Ht~,R I (F ,  (([All, A 1 . . . .  , IAnl, An, IA'I))) = true 
if and only if F ~ R(A  n, R (A  n 1 . . . . .  R(A1,  or ) . . . ) ) .  
Clearly, for each o-_ ¢D, H[~, RI is a model of (7, ~, Q),  and Ht~,, RI is a model of 
Dc = (7,  7, z)  if and only if (or, R) is a model of D A in the sense of [16]. Since D E 
is occurrence-sparse, by Proposition 2.1 all models of D E are of this form, so that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence b tween models of D A and such models of 
DE, and the proposition follows directly from the definition of Ht~,R 1. [] 
We conclude this section with some brief remarks about the .relationship 
between g" and the Language _,w 0 recently introduced by Baral, Gelfond and 
Provetti n [5], and discussed in more detail in [6]. 5 :  o is a "narrative" extension to 
d which uses ~"s underlying Situation Calculus based ontology. Conceptually, it is 
close to the extension of the Situation Calculus described by Pinto and Reiter in 
[34]. Both are concerned with describing and reasoning about an "actual path" 
through the "tree of situations." 
A model of an 5:0 domain description is a pair (~,  Z). The ,,qr,, component 
roughly corresponds to the notion of a (partial) "transition function" in a Language 
d model. For a given domain, • is characterised by a collection of effect laws in 
5:0, which is equivalent to a set of e-propositions in ~ and may be translated into a 
Language ~ domain description of the form (7, rtA, r ) as described in Proposition 
3.1. Given such a translation, the "E"  component of an -g~0 model can be regarded 
as an assignment of the situation symbol s u (always included in .g~0's vocabulary) to 
a particular A-sequence 6 N in HA, together with an assignment of each other 
situation symbol s i to a A-sequence 6 i such that 8i <a 8N" (In Pinto and Reiter's 
terms, ¢~N represents the "actual path of situations.") To be acceptable, the 
assignment 6u must be of minimal length, subject to certain constraints which 
are expressed as f luent  facts,  occurrence facts and precedence facts. For example, 
the occurrence fact "A1, A 2 occurs-at si" constraints 6 u to be of the form 
( (  Of 1 . . . . .  a i ,  IAI[, A1, IA2I, A2, . . .  , an)  ) (where ((  C~ 1 . . . . .  Oti)) is the A-sequence 6i 
assigned to si), and the precedence fact "s i precedes j" expresses the constraints 
6i <-A 6j and 8 i 4= 6j. The minimal length requirement for 6 N corresponds to the 
minimisation of the occurs predicate in Pinto and Reiter's extended Situation 
Calculus. 
A number of other papers which discuss the relationship between the Situation 
Calculus and the Event Calculus have recently been published, see for example 
[25], [30], [35], and [44]. 
4. DEALING WITH INCONSISTENT DOMAINS BY EXPLANATIONS 
Like the Language d ,  the Language ~ provides a very rigid way of specifying the 
effects of actions. Each separate ffect has to be explicitly described by a c-proposi- 
tion (analogous to an e-proposition in the Language d) ,  and the definition of 
entailment does not facilitate the inference of any other effects. For example, 
without an explicit representation of the statement "the action occurrence A 
terminates the property P"  the statement "P  is true before A, but false after- 
wards" gives rise to an inconsistency. This is in contrast o some other approaches 
to representing persistence, such as representations in circumscribed predicate 
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calculus, which in this respect are more flexible. The Language ~ is similarly rigid 
in its representation of a narrative--all action occurrences must be explicitly 
represented by an h-proposition. 
However, greater flexibility can be achieved, without altering the underlying 
semantics of ~, by introducing the notion of an explanation. Clearly, the statement 
that "property P is true before A, but false afterwards" is easily "explained" by the 
statement "A terminates P." In this section we model the task of explanation as 
the task of restoring consistency, in some principled or selective way, to an 
inconsistent collection of facts, represented as an inconsistent domain description 
in ~. Under this view, explanation is a form of belief revision. The nonmonotonic- 
ity built into our language sometimes allows an inconsistent domain theory to be 
"revised" simply by adding sets of propositions. We will call such sets "explana- 
tions." In the present context, explanations may be either in narrative or in casual 
terms, or in both. In other words, a given set of facts may be explained away in 
terms of what has happened and/or  in terms of what causes what. 
In Sections 5 and 6 we will extend the notion of an explanation, showing how in 
the context of narrative reasoning it is sometimes appropriate to regard informa- 
tion about what holds at earlier times as an "explanation" of what holds at later 
times. 
4.1. Explanations in Terms of  Action Occurrences 
The first class of explanations we will consider are those which can be expressed 
entirely in terms of action occurrences, i.e. extra h-propositions. We will use a 
version of Kautz's Stolen Car problem [23] as an illustration. 
Example 4.1. Let ~sc = (Jr, < ,{Park, Steal}, {Parked} ), where ~f" signifies the natu- 
ral numbers, and let Dsc be the domain description consisting of the following two 
c-propositions, ingle h-proposition and single t-proposition: 
Park initiates Parked 
Steal terminates Parked 
Park happens-at 2 
-1 Parked holds-at 6. 
By itself, D~c is inconsistent, since there is no terminating action occurrence for 
the fluent Parked between 2 and 6. However, we may restore consistency by adding 
one or more h-propositions. 
Definition 4.1 [h-explanation]. Let D = (y , r / , r )  be a domain description. An 
h-explanation for D is a (possibly empty) occurrence-sparse set r/, of h-proposi- 
tions, such that (y ,  ~/u ~,  ~-) is consistent. 
For example, the following are all h-explanations for D~c: 
{ Steal happens-at 3, Steal happens-at 4} 
{ Steal happens-at 4, Park happens-at 8} 
{ Steal happens-at 5}. 
Indeed, it is obvious that we may construct an h-explanation for D~c containing as 
many h-propositions as we like. Clearly, extra mechanisms are needed which 
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enable us to prefer some explanations to others. The following definition reflects a 
very simple, set-theoretic notion of preference. However, the definition could be 
modified for specific domains, for example to reflect the fact that we wish to regard 
some types of occurrence as more likely than others. 
Definition 4.2 [Preferable h-explanation]. 6 Let -q, and r/" be h-explanations for D. 
r/~ is preferable to r/" iff r/~ c 7". 
Having identified a class of explanations, uch as the class of h-explanations in
Definition 4.1, and a preference criterion such as that of Definition 4.2, it is 
possible to construct a corresponding meta-level, explanation-based "semantics" 
similar to the semantics of Abductive Logic Programming [19], [20], [13]. We 
consider all possible extensions of a given domain description D with optimal 
explanations, and accept conclusions if and only if these hold in each such 
extension. This semantics can then be used to decide what can be safely "inferred" 
from a seemingly inconsistent domain description. 
Definition 4.3 [Optimal h-explanation], rt, is an optimal h-explanation for D iff ~7, is 
a h-explanation for D and there is no other h-explanation 7/" for D such that ~/" 
is preferable to 7/,. 
Definition 4.4 [h-model]. Let D = (y ,~/ , r )  be a domain description. H is an 
h-model of D iff there exists an optimal h-explanation r/, for D such that H is a 
model of (y ,  ~/u 7/~, ~- ). 
Definition 4.5 [h-consistency]. A domain description is h-consistent iff it has at least 
one h-model. 
Definition 4.6 [h-entailment]. The domain description D = (y,r/,~-) h-entails the 
t-proposition "F  holds-at T", written "D ~h F holds-at T", iff for every 
h-model H of D, H(F, T)= true. D h-entails the t-proposition "-1 F holds-at 
T"  iff for every h-model H of D, H(F,T) =false. 
H-entailment is an abductive notion in the sense that optimal h-explanations are 
not derived from or entailed by a domain description, but are added to it 
(according to an external preference criterion). It also has a "deductive flavour" in 
the sense that a t-proposition is entailed from a domain description simply if it is 
true in all h-models. And any procedure for verifying truth in all h-models will, 
explicitly or implicitly, have to take into account all optimal h-explanations. 
The important point is that h-entailment is a meta-level concept, whereas the 
entailment relation defined in Section 2 is object-level. H-entailment is defined 
both in terms of object-level entailment and a particular preference criterion 
among explanations. Notice that Definitions 4.3 to 4.6 would still be applicable 
even if "h-preferability" were to be defined differently (perhaps according to 
domain-specific considerations), but would yield different results. 
6 In this definition and throughout the paper " c"  is intended to mean "is contained in and not 
equal to." 
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A desirable property of any such meta-level entailment is that it should coincide 
with object-level entailment whenever the domain description is consistent. The 
following proposition shows that for h-entailment as defined Definition 4.6 above, 
this is indeed the case. 
Proposition 4.1. Let D be a consistent domain description. Then H is a model o lD  if 
and only if H is an h-model of D. 
PROOF. The proposition follows directly from the observation that since D is 
already consistent, it has a unique optimal h-explanation O. [] 
Returning to the Stolen Car problem, Dsc has three optimal h-explanations: 
{ Steal happens-at 3} 
{ Steal happens-at 4} 
{ Steal happens-at 5} 
Dsc is therefore h-consistent, and has a total of six h-models (two corresponding to
each optimal h-explanation), since in any h-model H, H(Parked, O), H(Parked, 1) 
and H(Parked, 2) may either be true or all be false. It is easy to see, therefore, that 
Dsc ~h Parked holds-at 3 
and for all n > 6, 
Dsc ~h -~ Parked holds-at n. 
Hence this example illustrates how the notion of h-entailment exploits the narra- 
tive ontology of g' to give a natural and simple way to handle such apparently 
inconsistent domains. 
H-entailment corresponds closely to Shanahan's formulation of explanation- 
based temporal reasoning in [38]. The main difference is that whereas Shanahan's 
concern is to abduce a single explanation for a given fact or observation, ours is to 
"safely" infer new information by considering all (optimal) explanations. Shanahan's 
work was partly based on earlier work by Eshghi [15] showing how planning could 
be formulated within an abductive Event Calculus framework. In Language 
terms, an initial state I and goal state G can both be represented as sets r I and ~'c 
of t-propositions, domain information can be modelled as a set 3' of c-propositions, 
and a plan can be regarded as a single h-explanation 'lC/e for (y,  Q, ~'r U 7 c ) such 
that (y,  rte, ~-t ) ~ to for each to ~ z G. 
Our notion of an h-model is also somewhat analogous to the description of a 
Language 20 model given by Baral, Gelfond and Provetti n [5] and [6] (see end of 
Section 3). An important difference here is that, whereas the requirement that 
action occurrences be minimal is "hardwired" into ~0's object-level semantics, our 
minimality requirement is to be found in the particular definition of h-preference, 
which could potentially be replaced by or extended with other, domain-specific 
preference criteria. Indeed, in the following section we give an example of a 
preference criterion among a class of explanations which is not entirely based 
around a simple notion of minimality. 
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4.2. Explanation in Terms of New Causal Rules 
It will not always be possible to find an h-explanation for an inconsistent domain 
description D. In this section we briefly explore the possibilities of including both 
c-propositions and h-propositions in explanations. The discussion here is intended 
only to illustrate some of the problems relating to this--we are obviously trespass- 
ing into the related A.I. topic of learning. We will use the following (deliberately 
abstract) example to motivate the discussion. 
Example 4.2. Let ~'ex = (X, <_ ,{A1, A2},{F1, F2}), where X signifies the natural 
numbers, and let the domain description Dex consist of three t-propositions: 
F 1 holds-at 4 
F2 holds-at 5 
-7 F 2 holds-at 10. 
This example is neither consistent nor h-consistent. To establish consistency in 
this case we need to consider explanations which include both narrative and causal 
information. 
Definition 4.7 [hc-explanation]. I~t D = (y,T/,7) be a domain description. An 
hc-explanation for D is a pair (7~, ~) ,  where y~ is a (possibly empty) set of 
c-propositions and r/~ is a (possibly empty) occurrence-sparse t of h-proposi- 
tions, such that (Y u y~, T/u 7/~, ¢) is consistent. 
For example, according to Definition 4.7 the following are all hc-explanations 
for Dex: 
1. ({A 1 terminates F 2 when {F1}},{A 1 happens-at 8}) 
2. ({A 1 terminates F2},{A 1 happens-at 8}) 
3. ((A 1 terminates F: when (-~F1},A 2 terminates F1}, {A 2 happens-at 7, 
A] happens-at 8}) 
What qualifies as a "reasonable" preference criterion among hc-explanations? 
In practice such a criterion will probably be domain-specific. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to speculate at an abstract level, if only to discover the complexity of 
some of the issues involved. A simple or liberal view (in the sense that it would 
allow a wide class of optimal hc-explanations) would be to prefer hc-explanation e 
over hc-explanation e' only if e's set of c-propositions was strictly contained in 
e"s. However, this policy would not yield any preferences between the three 
hc-explanations in Example 4.2 above. Regarding Dex as representing three obser- 
vations at different ime points, it seems reasonable that we should prefer explana- 
tions which account for the observed change in F 2 but allow F 1 to persist. This 
would, for example, cut out explanation (3) above. The use of g~ to describe the 
process of learning new c-propositions from such sets of observations i  the subject 
of further investigation. 
5. PROJECTION DOMAIN DESCRIPTIONS 
In the following two sections, and again in Section 8, we focus attention on a 
particular subclass of languages and domain descriptions, which we will call the 
class of projection languages and the class of projection domain descriptions respec- 
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tively. 7 We have three reasons for doing so. In this section, we will show that it is 
possible to state syntactically verifiable conditions under which projection domain 
descriptions are consistent. In Section 6 we will show how we can use projection 
domain descriptions to formulate a notion of explanation complementary to that of 
Section 4. And in Section 8 we will show how for a particular class of domains we 
can build on this idea to develop meta-level Prolog implementations which facili- 
tate a "complete" form of automated reasoning both backwards and forwards in 
time. 
The defining characteristic of a projection language is that the set of time points 
includes a null or least element, which is given a special status as regards 
formulation of projection domain descriptions. 
Definition 5.1 [Projection Language]. A projection language is a domain language 
(I I ,  ~ ,  A, ~>, where 1I includes an element T O (a null or least element) such 
that for all T ~ II, T O ~ T. 
In this section and the next, we assume that ~ = (H,  ~,  A, ~)  is a projection 
language, and that T O is the null element of II. It will be convenient to identify a 
particular type of t-proposition which we will call an i-proposition ("i" for "initial"). 
Definition 5.2 [i-proposition]. An i-proposition in ~ is a t-proposition of the form 
L holds-at T O 
where L is a fluent literal of g'. We shall sometimes write this expression as 
initially L 
Definition 5.3 [Projection domain description]. A projection domain description in 
is a triple (T, r/, ~'i>, where T is a set of c-propositions, r/ is a set of h-proposi- 
tions, and ri is a set of i-propositions in ~. 
Thus projection domain descriptions are domain descriptions that only allow 
t-propositions abut the initial time point T o . 
Example 5.1. The following projection domain description uses the projection 
domain language ~ys = ( 3]+, -< ,{Shoot},{Alive, Loaded}) of Example 2.2, where 
,~ + signifies the non-negative r al numbers (so that T O = 0). 
Shoot terminates Alive when { Loaded} 
Shoot happens-at 2 
initially Alive 
initially Loaded. 
At first sight it appears that the restriction of the set z i in the definition above 
to contain only i-propositions i a major limitation. However, in Section 6 we will 
describe a mode of reasoning involving both projection domain descriptions and 
extra sets of t-propositions which have been identified as "observations" requiring 
explanation. 
7 Note that the class of Situation-Calculus-style languages of the form (Ha, -<a, A,q~) defined in 
Proposition 3.1 of Section 3are all examples ofprojection languages. 
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As stated above, one advantage of projection domains is that it is possible to 
characterise a whole class of such domains whose consistency can be easily verified. 
To state the appropriate proposition, we first need some extra definitions. 
Definition 5.4 [Initial consistency]. Let D= (y,  7/,ri) be a projection domain 
description. D is initially-consistent iff there is no fluent constant F such that 
both the i-proposition "initially F"  and the i-proposition "initially -1 F"  are 
in r i. 
The next definition is related to the notion of "e-consistency" defined by 
Denecker and De Schreye [11] in the context of the Language 5a¢. 
Definition 5.5 [Conflicting actions]. Let D be a domain description. The action 
constants A 1 and A 2 conflict in D iff D contains two c-propositions of the form 
"A1 initiates F when Cl"  and "A  2 terminates F when C2" and there is no 
fluent symbol F '  in ~ such that both F'  ~ C a U C 2 and ~ F'  ~ C 1 t3 C 2. When 
A 1 =A 2 =A we say that the action constant A self-conflicts in D. 
Definition 5.6 [Fluent independence]. Let D be a projection domain description. D 
is fluent-independent iff (i) there is no time point t and pair of h-propositions in
D of the form "A x happens-at t" and "A 2 happens-at t" such that A a and A 2 
conflict in D, and (ii) there is no h-proposition in D of the form "A happens-at 
t" such that A self-conflicts in D. 
Definition 5.7 [Non-convergence]. Let D be a domain description written in a 
language g" = ( I I ,  ~<, A, ~) .  D and g" are non-converging iff for every three 
(not necessarily distinct) time points T1, T 2 and T 3 in II such that T 1 ~ T 3 and 
T 2~T 3, then either T 1~<T 2 or T 2~T 1. 
Proposition 5.1. Let D be a projection domain description which is occurrence-sparse, 
non-converging, initially-consistent, and fluent-independent. Then D is consistent. 
PROOF. See Appendix B.2. [] 
6. OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 
In Section 4 we linked the notion of an explanation to the idea of transforming an 
inconsistent domain description into a consistent one. Another aspect of explana- 
tion that we might want to capture in the context of temporal domains is to explain 
what holds at a later time in terms of what holds at an earlier time. For example, 
we might wish to consider the statement "Fred is not alive" as explained by the 
statement "the gun was loaded when he was shot." This is an explanation of what 
holds at a later time in terms of what holds at an earlier time. 
In this section we consider only a special case of this type of explanation, which 
arises specifically in the case of projection domain descriptions. We will regard 
information about what holds at the least time point T O of a projection domain 
description as a potential explanation for observations about what holds at all later 
times. In doing so, we are implicitly according i-propositions a special status among 
t-proposit ions--rather than recording "observations," i-propositions are here re- 
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garded as statements about what was true "in the beginning" or "originally" 
(implicitly, before anyone was around to start recording observations or performing 
actions). Other t-propositions are re-introduced not simply as additional statements 
of the domain description, but as observations that need to be explained (in terms 
of what was originally true and/or  in terms of events that have occurred). 
Definition 6.1 [o-proposition]. An o-proposition in g" is a t-proposition of the form 
L holds-at T 
where T 4: T 0. 
Definition 6.2 [Observation set]. An observation set is a non-empty set of o-proposi- 
tions. 
Definition 6.3 [i-explanation]. Let D = (y,  ~, r i) be a projection domain description 
and let "rob be an observation set. An i-explanation for "rob in D is a set "ri~ of 
i-propositions uch that (% ~7,% U "r/f) is consistent and such that for each 
P~%b,  
( 3,, n, "ri u "ri,) ~ p. 
For simplicity, and in contrast o the discussion of Section 4, we do not include 
here any definition of preference between i-explanations, or any definition of 
optimality of an i-explanation. Our motivation for defining "i-entailment" below is 
simply to maintain the distinction between observations and other aspects of the 
domain theory while allowing conclusions arising from observations to be properly 
characterised. As with h-entailment, we are concerned with capturing a "safe" 
form of inference-- in terms of abduction, we want i-entailment to correspond to 
"entailment in all abductive xtensions." 
It is important o point out, however, that for specific domains we might well 
wish to introduce a definition of preference among i-explanations, and build this 
into the definition of i-entailment in exactly the same way as h-preference is 
incorporated in the definition of h-entailment. For example, given the observation 
that "the car didn't start after the ignition was turned," we might prefer the 
explanations that "the battery was dead" or that "the car had no petrol" to the 
explanation that "the car had no engine." 
Definition 6.4 [i-model]. Let D = (3', 7/, %) be a projection domain description and 
let "rob be an observation set. H is an i-model of D with "rob iff there exists an 
i-explanation "ri, for "rob in D such that H is a model of (y ,~, ' r /U  "ri,). 
Definition 6.5 [i-consistency]. Let D be a projection domain description and let 'rob 
be an observation set. D is i-consistent with "rob iff there is at least one i-model 
of D with "rob" 
Definition 6.6 [i-entailment]. Let D be a projection domain description and let "rob 
be an observation set. D with Tob i-entails the t-proposition "F holds-at T," 
written "D,'rob ~i F holds-at T," iff for every i-model H of D with "rob, 
H(F,  T) = true. D with "rob i-entails the t-proposition "-1 F holds-at T"  iff for 
every i-model H of D with 7oh, H(F,  T)=false.  
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The following proposition shows that the particular definition of i-entailment 
above amounts to a re-characterisation f entailment as defined in Section 2, 
keeping the distinction between observation sets and projection domain descrip- 
tions. Note, however, that the proposition would not necessarily hold if we were to 
incorporate a (domain-specific) notion of i-preference in the definitions above. 
Proposition 6.1. Let D = (y,  7/, 7-~) be an occurrence-sparse domain description and let 
~'ob be an observation set. Then H is a model of ( y, rl, Ti U "rob ) if and only if H is 
an i-model of D with rob. 
PROOF. See Appendix B.3. [] 
Example 6.1. Let ~'ysp = (~ +, <,  {Shoot}, {Alive, Loaded}), where ~ + signifies the 
non-negative real numbers, and let the projection description Dysp consist of a 
single c-proposition and a single h-proposition: 
Shoot terminates Alive when { Loaded} 
Shoot happens-at 2. 
Let ,Cysp be the observation set containing the following two o-propositions: 
Alive holds-at 1 
Alice holds-at 3 
It is easy to see that there is a unique i-explanation for Zysp in Dysp: 
{ initially Loaded, initially Alive}. 
Hence for all n > 0 
Dysp, Tysp ~i Loaded holds-at n. 
The notions of i-explanation and h-explanation described in this section and in 
Section 4 are complementary and can be combined in an obvious way. 
Definition 6. 7 [ih-explanation]. Let D = (y,  r/, ri) be a projection domain descrip- 
tion and let rob be an observation set. An ih-explanation for rob in D is a pair 
(r/,, r i ,),  where r/, is an occurrence-sparse set of h-propositions and "ri, is a set 
of i-propositions, such that (y ,  7/U r/,, r i U zi~) is consistent and such that for 
each p ~ ~'ob, 
(7, nu *q~,z~u "r~,) ~p.  
However, it is less obvious when one ih-explanation should be considered 
preferable to another. To conclude this section, we compare two preference 
relations for ih-explanations, both of which might be reasonable for particular 
classes of domains. We illustrate their different effects with an example. The 
following discussion lends further weight to the viewpoint hat, although the object 
level semantics of Section 2 is domain-independent, decisions as to which explana- 
tions for inconsistent domains or for sets of observations should be preferred will, 
in general, be based partly on consideration of the specific domain. 
The first preference relation we consider is as follows. It compares only the 
h-propositions in two given ih-explanations. 
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Definition 6.8 [Preferable ih-explanation]. Let E : (r/,, ri~) and e' = (r/', r~,) be 
ih-explanations for rob in D. e is ih-preferable to e' iff r/, c r/~. 
Definition 6.9 [Optimal ih-explanation], e is an optimal ih-explanation for rob in D 
iff e is an ih-explanation for rob in D and there is no other ih-explanation ~' 
for rob in D such that e' is ih-preferable to e. 
Definition 6.10 [ih-model]. Let D = (y,r/,~- i) be a projection domain description 
and let "rob be an observation set. H is an ih-model o lD  with rob iff there exists 
an optimal ih-explanation e = (rt,, r i , )  for rob in D such that H is a model of 
(7, "0 U r/,, ri U r~,) 
Definition 6.11 [ih-entailment]. Let D be a projection domain description and let 
rob be an observation set. D with rob ih-entails the t-proposition "F  holds-at 
T," written "D, rob ~ih F holds-at T," iff for every ih-model H of D with rob, 
H(F,  T) = true. D with rob ih-entails the t-proposition "--7 F holds-at T" iff for 
every ih-model H of D with rob, H(F,  T)=false. 
Example 6.2. This example involves a video-recorder with an automatic timer. 
Suppose Fred returns home one evening and wishes to check if his video-recorder 
has automatically started recording his favourite TV show. Although he cannot 
look inside the recording machine to check if it is recording directly, he knows that 
if the machine is working, when the timer triggers it will both turn the "record" 
light on and begin recording. Fred also knows that if the machine is not working it 
can be repaired. When Fred left home, the record light was not on. When he 
returns, the light is on, and Fred concludes that the machine is recording. 
We can represent Fred's domain knowledge with a projection domain descrip- 
tion Dre c consisting of three c-propositions: 
TimerTrigger initiates LightOn when { Working} 
TimerTrigger initiates Recording when { Working} 
Repair initiates Working. 
Fred's observations, that the recording light was off when he left home but is on 
when he returns, are represented by the observation set rre c: 
{ ~ LightOn holds-at T L , LightOn holds-at Tn} 
where T L, T n ~ II represent he times at which Fred left and returned home 
respectively. It is easy to see that all optimal ih-explanations for "ire c in Dre c are  of 
the form 
({TimerTrigger happens-at T}, {initially Working, initially ~ LightOn} )
for some T ~ I/ such that T L ~ T -< TR, so that 
Drec, Trec ~ih Recording holds-at T R 
and hence the notion of ih-entailment correctly models Fred's reasoning in this 
respect. 
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In the example above, Fred can also use ih-entailment o reason that his 
video-recorder was functioning properly at time TL (and indeed at any time point 
whatsoever), i.e., 
D . . . .  Trec ~ih Working holds-at T L . 
In doing so, Fred rejects ih-explanations in which an extra Repair action occurs at 
some time before the TimerTrigger action. It is a matter of debate as to whether, 
for this domain, it is reasonable to do this. But it is not hard to formulate an 
alternative preference criterion among ih-explanations which does not cause such 
alternatives to be rejected: 
Definition 6.12 [Preferable ih-explanation]. Let e = (T/E , TiE ) and e '= (7/', ~'~E') be 
( [ [  p t ih-explanations for %b in D. e is ih-preferable to e' iff ~E ~E and ~'iE = TiE" 
In other words, explanations are only "~-comparable" if they contain the same 
i-propositions. Assuming definitions exactly analogous to Definitions 6.9, 6.10 and 
6.11 for an optimal i-h-explanation, an ih-model, and l~-entailment respectively, it is 
easy to see that all optimal ih-explanations are also optimal ~-explanations, but 
that (for the example above) optimal ~-explanations can also be of the form 
({Repair happens-at T', TimerTrigger happens-at T}, 
{ initially ~ Working, initially -~ LightOn} ) 
for some T', T ~ 11 such that T L ~< T-< T R and T '< T. Hence, although (as for 
ih-entailment) 
Drec, Tre E ~ 7~Recording holds-at T R 
Fred cannot use ih-entailment to conclude that his video-recorder was working 
when he left the house. 
It is not hard to think up examples either where ih-entailment or where 
ih-entailment seems more plausible. The choice seems to depend on whether (for 
the particular domain) one is more concerned with assuming as few action 
occurrences as possible (ih-entailment), or whether one is more concerned with 
giving equal consideration to all possible initial conditions, even in the face of 
observations at later times (~-entailment). 
7. LOGIC PROGRAMS FOR $" DOMAINS 
In the following two sections we discuss the implementation of Language 
domains. In this section we study how we can construct Event Calculus style logic 
programs from domain descriptions in general. In Section 8 we show how, for a 
class of projection domain descriptions, (simplified versions o0 these programs can 
be enhanced using standard Prolog "second-order" programming techniques. 
In the original Event Calculus there was an implicit assumption that all 
predicate definitions were complete. In other words, it was assumed that for each 
predicate its negation (negation as failure) was true whenever the positive instance 
did not hold. Although the semantics of g~ incorporates an analogous assumption 
or h-propositions and c-propositions, this assumption does not extend to t-proposi- 
tions (equivalent to Holds or HoldsAt literals in Event Calculus programs)-- it is 
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possible for a domain description D to be "incomplete" in the sense that, for some 
fluent constant F and time T, neither "F  holds-at T" nor "7  F holds-at T" is 
entailed by D. 
However, we can partly avoid the implementation difficulties that this causes by 
representing negative fluent literals inside the HoldsAt predicate. In the program 
translations defined below, the t-proposition "-~ F holds-at T"  is represented by 
the positive literal HoldsAt(Neg(F),T),  whereas the negative literal not 
HoldsAt(F, T) is simply interpreted as 'the t-proposition "F  holds-at T" is not 
provable.' In this and other respects, the translation method here is similar to that 
in [30]. Analogous techniques are used in [16], [14], and [4], although not with 
Event Calculus style programs. 
Given that our aim is to develop programs able to deal correctly with the form 
of incompleteness described above, it is useful to first consider incomplete or 
partial interpretations for a domain description and examine what can be com- 
puted from these. 
Definition 7.1 [Partial interpretation]. A partial interpretation of ~ is a partial 
mapping 
I : ep × II ~ {true,false} 
In the discussion which follows, we assume that Definitions 2.8 and 2.9 of "point 
satisfaction" and an "initiation" or "termination point" are extended to cover 
partial interpretations a well as interpretations. In addition, we need counterparts 
to these notions which deal with cases where I(F, T) is undefined. 
Definition 7.2 [Possible point satisfaction]. Given a set of fluent literals C of g~ and 
a time point T ~ II, a partial interpretation I possibly satisfies C at T i f f  for each 
fluent constant F ~ C, I(F, T) 4:false, and for each fluent constant F' such that 
F' ~ C, I(F', T) 4: true. 
Definition 7.3 [Possible initiation/termination point]. Let I be a partial interpreta- 
tion of ~, let D be a domain description, let F ~ qb and let T~ II. T is a 
possible initiation-point (respectively possible termination-point) for F in I relative 
to D iff there is an A ~ A such that (i) there is both an h-proposition i  r /o f  the 
form "A happens-at T"and a c-proposition in 3' of the form "A initiates F 
when C" (respectively "A terminates F when C") and (ii) I possibly satisfies C 
at T. 
Let us denote the set of all partial interpretations byS.  Motivated by Definition 
2.10 of a model for a domain D, we can define an associated (partial) operator on 
..7 as follows. 
Definition 7.4 [Operation Y]. Given a domain description D = (y ,  77, r )  the partial 
operator ~@-:.Y'~J is defined as follows: For any partial interpretation I ~ J ,  
and any F ~ ~, T ~ II. 
1. (a) For any T 1 ~ II such that T 1 < T, if there is no possible initiation-point 
or possible termination-point T 2 for F in I relative to D such that 
TI ~ T 2 -< T, then (Ur)(I)(F,T) =I (F ,  T1). 
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(b) For any T 2 ~ I-I such that T -< T 2, if there is no possible initiation-point 
or possible termination-point T 1 for F in I relative to D such that 
T~ T 1 -< T 2, then (~gr)(I)(F,T) =I(F,  T2). 
2. If T 1 is an initiation-point for F in I relative to D, T1 -< T and there is no 
possible termination-point T 2 for F in I relative to D such that T 1 ~ T 2 -< 
T, then (9-)( I)( F, T) = true. 
3. If T~ is a termination-point for F in I relative to D, T 1 -< T and there is no 
possible initiation-point T 2 for F in I relative to D such that T 1 -< T 2 -< T, 
then (~r)(I)(F, T) =false. 
4. If there is a t-proposition in r of the form "F holds-at T," then 
( Y ) (  I ) (  F, T) =true, 
and if there is a t-proposition of the form "--1 F holds-at T," 
(~,~-) ( I ) ( F, T ) =false. 
5. Otherwise (~r)(I)(F, T) is undefined. 
Note that this operator is not always defined, as it is possible for these rules to 
require the assignment of both true and false to (~r)(I)(F, T) for some F and T. 
It is easy to see that conditions (1) to (4) in the definition above correspond 
closely to conditions (1) to (4) of Definition 2.10 of a model. The following 
definition and three propositions how the relationship between Language g~ 
models and the operator Y. 
Definition 7.5 [The ordering _c]. For any two partial interpretations 11, 12 E,)  r, 11 is 
contained in I2, written 11 c_I2, iff (i) for any F and T if I I (F ,T)=true then 
I2( F, T) = true, and (ii) if II( F, T) =false then I2( F, T) =false. 
Proposition 7.1. Let D be a domain description. If  D is consistent then any model H of 
D is a greatest (with respect o the ordering c_) fixedpoint o f~.  
PRoov. The proof follows directly from the construction of 3- and the observation 
that since H is a total mapping the definition for possible initiation-point (respec- 
tively possible termination-point) coincides with that of initiation-point (respec- 
tively termination-point). [] 
When a domain D is consistent we can apply the operator J iteratively to 
compute a partial interpretation that would be a subset of any model of D. 
Proposition 7.2. Let D be a consistent domain description, let H be a model o lD and 
let I be a partial interpretation such that I c H. Then ~'(I) c H. 
PROOF. The proof follows by comparing the different cases under which 9- applies 
with conditions (1)-(4) in Definition 2.10 of a model, and noticing that the 
following two properties hold for every T ~ 17I and F ~ ~: (i) if T is an initiation- 
point (respectively termination-point) for F in I then T is an initiation-point 
(respectively, termination-point) for F in H and (ii) if T is not a possible 
initiation-point (respectively, possible termination-point) for F in I then T is not a 
initiation-point (respectively, termination-point) for F in H. [] 
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Proposition 7.3. Let D be a consistent domain description and let the sequence 
Io,.. . ,  I n . . . .  of partial interpretations be defined as follows: 
• I 0=O 
• In+ 1 = In O~( l , )  for each countable ordinal n > O. 
Then there exists a least fixed point I ÷ of this sequence, and D entails any 
t-proposition of the form "F  holds-at T" (respectively, "~ F holds-at T") such 
that I ÷ ( F, T) = true (respectively, I ÷ ( F, T) =false). 
PROOF. By Proposition 7.2 when D is consistent his sequence is well defined. 
Also, by construction the sequence is monotonic (with respect o the ordering _c of 
Definition 7.5) and hence the least fixed point I ÷ exists. Again by Proposition 7.2 
I+___ H for any model H of D and hence the result follows. [] 
Given Proposition 7.3, we can use Definition 7.4 to "read off" a logic program 
that implements ~r and computes consequences belonging to I +. To simplify our 
definitions we assume that some logic program or external definition of the order 
relation ~ is available. 
Definition 7.6 [Ordering program]. Given the language g '= (l-I, ~ ,A ,~) ,  the 
program P( I I ,  ~)  is an ordering program for g" iff 
• for all T ,T '• I I ,  P( I I ,  ~)  succeeds on the query T~T'  if and only if 
T ~ T', and finitely fails otherwise. 
• for all T, T' • H, P(H,  ~)  succeeds on the query T-< T' if and only if 
T-< T', and finitely fails otherwise. 
• None of the following predicate symbols appear in P( I I ,  ~): HoldsAt, 
Given, ClippedBetween, HappensAt, Possiblylnitiates, Initiates, Possibly Ter- 
minates, Terminates, AffectedBetween. 
We will also need the following preliminary definitions. 
Definition 7. 7 [lp-term and lp-complement]. Given a fluent literal L of ~ = (H, 
~ ,  A,@), the lp-term of L, written A(L), is defined to be 
• Pos(F) if L =F  for some F•  
• Neg(F) if L = -7 F for some F•  qb 
and the lp-complement of L, written A(L),  is defined to be 
• Neg(F) if L =F  for some F • 
• Pos(F) if L = -7 F for some F•  qb 
Definition 7.8 [Finite domain description]. The domain description (y ,~,z )  is 
finite iff 7, r/ and ~- are all finite, and for each c-proposition in 7 either of the 
form "A initiates F when C" or of the form "A terminates F when C," C is 
also finite. 
Our translation from domain descriptions to logic programs can now be given. 
In the definition below, the five clauses defining HoldsAt correspond to rules 
( la)-(4) in Definition 7.4 of the operator 3- [Clauses (LPla) and (LPlb) are 
"special cases" of rules ( la) and (lb)]. The use of negation-as-failure and fluent 
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converses in the domain-specific clauses defining the predicates Possiblylnitiates 
and PossiblyTerminates reflects Definition 7.3 of a possible initiation and possible 
termination point. 
Definition 7.9 [LP[D,  P(I I ,  ~)]]. Given a finite domain description D = (3', 7/, r )  
written in the language g~ = (F I, ~ ,  A, ~) ,  and an ordering program P(I I ,  ~), 
the logic program LP[D,P ( I I ,  ~)] is defined as the program P(I I ,  ~)  aug- 
mented with the following general clauses 
HoldsAt( l, t3)  
Given(l ,  t l ) ,  t 1 -< t3, not AffectedBetween( tl, 1, t3). (LPla)  
HoldsAt( l, t l) ~- 
Given ( l, t 3 ), t I "< t 3, not AffectedBetween ( t 1, l, t 3 ). ( LP 1 b) 
HoldsAt( Pos( f ), t 3 ) ~-- 
HappensAt( a , t l ) , t ~ -< t 3 , Initiates( a , f , t l) ,  (LP2) 
not ClippedBetween( tl, Pos ( f ) ,  t 3). 
HoldsAt( Neg( f ), t 3 ) ~-- 
HappensAt ( a, t 1), t 1 -< t 3 , Terminates( a, f ,  t I ), (LP3) 
not ClippedBetween ( tl, Neg ( f ) ,  t 3 ). 
HotdsA t( 1, t ) ~ Given ( l, t ). ( LP4 ) 
ClippedBetween( tl, Pos ( f ) ,  t 3 ) 
HappensAt( a, t 2 ) ,  t 1 ~ t2, t 2 ~ t3, (LP5)  
PossiblyTerminates( a, f ,  t 2 ) .  
ClippedBetween ( tl, Ueg ( f ) ,  t 3 ) 
HappensAt(a,  t2), t 1 ~ t2, t 2 -< t3, (LP6) 
Possiblylnitiates( a, f ,  t 2 ). 
AffectedBetween( t ~, l, t 3) ,--- CtippedBetween( t l, l, t 3). ( LP7 ) 
AffectedBetween( tl, Ueg( f ), t 3 ) ~- ( LP8 ) 
ClippedBetween( t,, Pos( f ), t 3). 
Affectednetween ( tl, nos ( f ) ,  t 3 ) 
ClippedBetween( t, , Neg( f ) , t 3 ). (LP9)  
and the following domain-specific clauses 
• For each t-proposition "L holds-at T"  in ~-, the clause 
Given( A(L),  r ) .  
• For each h-proposition "A happens-at T" in r/, the clause 
HappensAt( A ,  T ) . 
For each c-proposition "A initiates F when {L 1 . . . . .  Ln}" in y, the clause 
Initiates( A ,  F, t) 
HoldsAt( A( L I ), t) . . . . .  HoldsAt( A(Ln), t). 
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and the clause 
Possiblylnitiates( A,  F, t) 
not HoldsAt( h-(~l ) , t ) . . . . .  not HoldsAt( h~CU~ ) , t ). 
• For each c-proposition "A terminates F when {L 1 . . . . .  Ln}" in 3', the 
clause 
Terminates( A,  F, t) 
HoldsAt ( A( L, ), t) . . . . .  HoldsAt ( A( L,  ), t).  
and the clause 
Possibly Terminates( A,  F, t) 
not HoldsAt (a--(~l ) , t ) . . . . .  not HoldsAt (a--(~ ) , t ) . 
Intuitively, given Propositions 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 it is easy to see that the programs 
described above behave correctly for consistent domain descriptions, ince Clauses 
(LPla)-(LP4) either correspond exactly to or are just special cases of conditions 
( la)-(4) in Definition 7.4. The following proposition 8 confirms this intuition. 
Proposition 7.4. Let P(I I ,  ,<) be an ordering program for ~, and let D be a finite 
domain description. Then for any fluent literal L of ~ and any T ~ II, if 
LP[D,  P( [I, ~ )] F--SLDN F HoldsAt(A(L) ,  T) 
then 
D k L holds-at T. 
PROOF. See Appendix B.4. [] 
To a certain extent, the above logic programs overcome the two limitations of 
formalizations of action in normal logic programming identified by Gelfond and 
Lifschitz in [16]. That is to say, (i) if the values of some fluents at one or more time 
points are given, they facilitate automated reasoning about what holds at other 
time points before, afterwards or in between, and (ii) as shown by Proposition 7.4, 
the programs behave correctly even when the information entailed by their 
Language ~ specifications i incomplete. 
However, although they are sound, the above logic programs do not compute all 
consequences of every domain under its semantics as given by Definition 2.10. This 
potential incompleteness is illustrated by the following example. 
Example 7.1. Let ~, and D,, be the domain language description respectively of 
Example 2.1, and suppose that P (~,  <) is an ordering program for g'~. Then the 
8 In this and subsequent propositions, the symbol [--SLDNF signifies the existence of an SLDNF 
derivation, defined as for example in[28]. However, for clarity of presentation, i  proposition proofs we 
avoid working directly with this type of definition, and instead refer to SLDNF derivations u ing the 
usual (Prolog) programming terminology. 
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logic program LP[D~, P(9], <)] consists of the program P(~,  <) together with 
clauses (LPla)-(LP9) of Definition 7.9 and the domain-specific clauses 
Initiates( InjectA, Protected, t) <--- 
HoldsAt( Pos( TypeO ), t ). 
Possiblylnitiates( InjectA, Protected, t) 
not HoldsAt( Ueg( TypeO ), t ). 
Initiates( InjectB , Protected, t) 
HoldsAt( Ueg( TypeO ), t ). 
Possiblylnitiates( InjectB, Protected, t) <--- 
not HoldsAt ( Pos( TypeO ), t ) . 
HappensAt( InjectA ,2). 
HappensAt( InjectB, 3). 
Given( Neg( Protected), 1). 
As it stands, the query HoldsAt(Pos(Protected), 4)will fail on this program even 
though the corresponding t-proposition is entailed by its specification. Notice 
however that the query can be made to succeed by adding either Giv- 
en(Pos(TypeO), n) or Given(Neg(TypeO), n) to the program for some time point 
n < 2. The example also illustrates the necessity of using the Possiblylnitiates and 
PossiblyTerminates predicates. Had the program definition of ClippedBetween been 
given simply in terms of Initiates and Terminates, the query HoldsAt(Neg(Pro- 
tected), 4) would succeed, even though the t-proposition "-1 Protected holds-at 4" is 
not entailed by D r. Finally, notice that the success of the goal HoldsAt(Neg(Pro- 
tected), 0) (trivially) demonstrates the utility of this type of program for reasoning 
backwards in time. 
8. META-LEVEL PROGRAMS FOR COMPUTING 1-ENTAILMENT 
In this section we show how, for a class of domains, we can exploit the meta-level 
characterisation f i-entailment given in Section 6 to build meta-level programs 
which facilitate a more "complete" form of reasoning (both backwards and for- 
wards in time) than the object-level programs of the previous ection. The impor- 
tant characteristic of the programs given below is that they maintain the distinction 
between observations, which are dealt with at the meta-level, and other parts of the 
domain theory. 
The object-level programs upon which our meta-level implementation is built 
are simplified versions of the programs described in Section 7. The simplification is
possible because of the following property of projection domain descriptions. If D 
is a projection domain description which contains either the i-proposition "initially 
F"  or the i-proposition "initially --1 F"  for every fluent constant F, then D is 
"complete" in the sense that it has at most one model (this follows from Proposi- 
tion 2.1). If 8" is non-converging, and D is fluent-independent, D has exactly one 
model (this follows from Proposition 5.1). Hence, in the case where D is also finite 
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(so that there are only a finite number of fluent constants in g'), it is not hard to 
construct a simplified Event Calculus style program for D enabling complete 
automated reasoning forwards in time from the initial time point T O . For reasons 
which will shortly become apparent, we will represent he ("complete" set of) 
i-propositions of D in list form inside a three-argument version of the HoldsAt 
predicate, rather than with a Given predicte as previously. In Definition 8.2 below, 
HoldsAt(M, L, T) should be read as "D ~ holds-at T, where M is (a list represen- 
tation of) the set of i-propositions in D." 
It is easy to see that clauses (EC7)- (ECl l )  which define HoldsAt are a 
simplification of clauses (LPla)-(LP9) in Definition 7.9. Here it is not necessary to 
distinguish between the predicates Initiates (respectively, Terminates) and Possi- 
blylnitiates (respectively, PossiblyTerminates), and clauses (LPla), (LPlb) and (LP4) 
can be condensed into the single clause (EC7). This is because, at the (object) level 
of calls to the HoldsAt predicate, complete information is available about what 
holds at the initial time point To, and we are only interested in reasoning forwards 
in time from this point. Incompleteness and reasoning backwards in time are 
instead dealt with at the meta-level. 
We wish to construct a program able to test whether a particular t-proposition is
i-entailed by some projection domain description D' (which, unlike D above, may 
not have an i-proposition for each fluent) together with some observation set %b" 
All that remains to be done is to define a meta-level program able to use the 
HoldsAt predicate to test the truth of the t-proposition in each extension of D' 
with a "maximal" i-explanation for rob. (It is sufficient o consider only maximal 
i-explanations, i.e., those which mention every fluent in the language, because of 
the monotonicity of g~ as regards addition of t-propositions to any domain 
description--see the remarks at the end of Section 2.) This is achieved in a 
straightforward way by clauses (EC1)-(EC6) in Definition 8.2 below. In this 
definition, IHoldsAt(L, T) should be read as "D', rob ~i L holds-at T." IExplana- 
tion(M) should be read as "M is a (maximal) i-explanation for rob in D'." 
In Definition 8.2, a Prolog-like syntax for lists is used. Thus the term [ ] 
represents the empty list and the term [Head IRemainder] represents a non-empty 
list whose first element is Head. Suitable definitions of the standard list predicates 
Member and Append are assumed. The two meta-level (or "second-order") predi- 
cates Setof and Forall are also used. To summarise their functions, Forall(Con- 
dition, Goal) succeeds if for all solutions of Condition, Goal succeeds. 
Setof(X, Goal, Instances) succeeds if Instances is the set of instances of X for 
which Goal succeeds, where sets are represented as (possibly empty) lists without 
repetitions. For practical details of the use of these predicates in the context of 
Prolog programming, the reader may consult [42]. [It is also assumed that the 
predicates IHoldsAt, IExplanation, Permutation, and ConsistentWithObservations d  
not appear in the ordering program P(I I ,  ~ ).] 
Definition 8.1. The domain language g~ = (H,  ~,  A, ~)  is fluent-finite iff the set 
is finite. 
Definition 8.2 [EC[D, rob, P(H,  ~)]]. Let D = (3', r/, r )  be a finite projection do- 
main description written in a fluent-finite projection language g" = (1I, ~ ,  A, ~) .  
Let T O be the null element of II, and let P(H,  ~)  be an ordering program for 
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g'. Let Tob be a finite observation set. The logic program EC[D,%b, P(II, 4)] is 
defined as the program P(II, ~) augmented with the following general clauses 
IHoldsAt( l, t) ~ (EC1) 
ForaU( IExplanation( m ), HoldsAt( m, l, t) ). 
IExplanation( m ) 
Setof( l, ( Initially ( l )  ), i ), 
Setof ( f ,  
( Fluent ( f ) ,  not Initially ( Pos ( f ) ) ,  not Initially ( Neg ( f )  ) ), (EC2) 
p) ,  
Permutation( p, c ) , Append( c, i, m ) , 
ConsistentWithObservations (m) .  
Permutation([ ],[ ]). (EC3) 
Permutation( [f[ rl], [f[ r2]) ,-- Permutation( r 1, r2). (EC4) 
Permutation( [ f l r l ] , [ Neg ( f ) [ r 2 ] ) ,--- Permutation( r l , r2). (EC5) 
ConsistentWithObservations( m ) 
Forall( Observation( l, t ), HoldsAt( m, 1, t) ). ( EC6) 
HoldsAt( m,  l, t3) 
Member(l ,  m ) , not ClippedBetween( m, T o , l, t 3). (EC7) 
HoldsAt( m, Pos( f ) , t 3) 
nappensAt( a, t I ), t 1 "< t 3 , Initiates( m, a, f ,  t 1 ) ,  (EC8) 
not ClippedBetween ( m, t, , Pos ( f ) ,  t 3). 
HoldsAt( m, Ueg( f ), t 3 ) 
HappensAt( a, t 1 ), t I -< t3 , Terminates(m, a, f ,  t 1 ), (EC9) 
not ClippedBetween( m, tl, Ueu( f ), t3). 
ClippedBetween( m, t l, Pos( f ), t 3) 
HappensAt( a, t 2 ) ,  t I ~ t2 , t 2 -< t3 , (EC10) 
Terminates(m, a, f ,  t 2). 
ClippedBetween( m, t 1 , Ueg( f ), t 3 ) 
Happens( a, t 2), t 1 ~ tz, t 2 -< t3, (ECI 1) 
Initiates(m, a, f ,  t 2 ). 
and the following domain-specific clauses 
• For each fluent constant F ~ th, the clause 
Fluent (F ) .  
• For each i-proposition "initially L" in zi, the clause 
Initially( A(L)). 
• For each o-proposition "L holds-at T" in rob, the clause 
Observation ( A (L ) ,  T ) . 
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• For each h-proposition "`4 happens-at T"  in rt, the clause 
HappensAt( A,  T ) . 
• For each c-proposition "A initiates F when {L 1 . . . . .  Zn}"  in y, the clause 
Initiates( m, A,  F, t) 
HoldsAt( m, ;t( L l ) ,  t ), . . . , Holds,4t( m, ~( Ln), t ). 
• For each c-proposition "`4 te rminates  F when (L  1 . . . . .  L,}" in 3', the 
clause 
Terminates(m, .4, F, t) 
Holds,It(m, A( L 1 ), t) . . . . .  HoldsAt (m , A(L , ) ,  t ) . 
Example 8.1. Let ~ysp, Dysp and "Cysp be the domain language, domain descrip- 
tion and observation set respectively of Example 6.1. Let P(.~+, <)be  an ordering 
program for ~ysp. Then the logic program EC[ Dysp, .Cysp, P (~ +, < )] consists of the 
program P(9]+, <)  together with clauses (EC1)- (EC11) of Definition 8.2 and the 
domain-specific clauses 
Terminates(m, Shoot, ,4live, t) ~ Holds,4t( m, Pos( Loaded), t ) . 
Fluent(,4live). 
Fluent (Loaded). 
Observation ( Pos (Alive), 1). 
Observation( Neg( Alive ), 3). 
HappensAt( Shoot, 2). 
Although potentially somewhat inefficient, the programs described in Definition 
8.2 are of interest because they enable sound derivations 9 of t-propositions which 
would not be possible with the object-level programs given in the previous section. 
For example, it is easy to verify, either by inspection or using a Prolog interpreter, 
that 
EC[ Dyep , Tysp , P( ~ +, ~ )] WSLDNF IHoldsAt( Pos( Loaded), 0). 
Indeed, for a wide class of  domains they are both sound and "complete," in the 
sense of  Proposition 8.1 below. Since any finite, consistent Language ~¢" domain as 
defined in [16] may be translated directly into a Language ~ projection domain 
description together with an observation set (see Section 3), finite ~ '  domains may 
also be given a meta-level implementation of this type. 1° 
9 In order to continue to refer to "SLDNF derivations," we assume that the meta-level primitives 
Setof and Forall are appropriate re-interpreted (see [42] for details). 
10 Strictly speaking, the translation method described in Definition 8.2 is not applicable to the 
Language ~¢ type domain descriptions described in Section 3 Proposition 3.1. This is because the 
"complete occurrence set" of h-propositions i infinite (see Definition 3.3). But the appropriate 
modification to Definition 8.2 is trivial, and does not necessitate a significant change to the proof of 
Proposition 8.1. An example ordering program P(Ila, -<a ) is given in Appendix C together with the 
necessary changes to Definition 8.2. 
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Proposition 8.1. Let g" = (II ,  4 ,  A, ~)  be a fluent-finite, non-converging projection 
language, let P(I I ,  ~<) be an ordering program for ~, and let D = (y,~7, zi) be a 
finite, initially-consistent, fluent-independent projection domain description in ~. 
Let %b be a finite observation set. Then for any fluent literal L of ~ and any T E H, 
EC[ D, "rob, P( I I ,  ~ )] ~--SLDNF IHoldsAt( A( L ), T) 
if and only if 
D, %b ~i L holds-at T. 
PROOF. See Appendix B.5. [] 
As stated in Proposition 5.1, it is possible to verify the consistency of the class of 
projection domain descriptions described in Proposition 8.1 by a syntactic heck. 
Note that we can now build on this proposition to check for i-consistency with a 
given observation set, simply by verifying the success of the unground call IExpla- 
nation(m). Finally, the style of the programs described in this section offers some 
clue as to how we might in principle implement a preference criterion added to the 
definition if i-entailment, by appropriately extending the program definition of 
IExplanation. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
Following the methodology of the Language ~¢ introduced in [16], we have 
presented a simple declarative language, ~, for describing narratives with actions. 
is based on a narrative ontology inherited from the Event Calculus, thus 
demonstrating that this methodology is not limited to the particular ontology of ~.  
~'s  semantics is based around a simple characterisation of persistence which 
facilitates a modular approach to extending the expressivity of the language. This 
characterisation relies heavily on the notion of a flow of time which is independent 
from any actions which may occur. The benefits of this become particularly 
apparent when representing domains where periods of time elapse in which a 
change may or may not have taken place. It is not necessary to "fill in" time with 
an artificial "action" such as a "Wait." 
The explicit notion of an action occurrence incorporated in ~ allows an 
important class of "narrative" explanations (h-explanations) to be characterised in
a simple way. These enable us to extend an otherwise inconsistent theory written in 
so as to establish consistency, thus providing a natural method, in many cases, to 
account for conflicting sets of information about the domain. More generally, our 
formalisation of various notions of explanation within N illustrates that common 
sense reasoning need not always be modelled as deduction at a single object level. 
Our results are built upon much previous work concerning the role of abduction in 
Artificial Intelligence and related areas. Once again we have demonstrated that 
reasoning from cause to effect can be modelled at the object level, whereas 
reasoning from effect to cause can be regarded as an essentially meta-level (for 
example abductive) activity. In the context of reasoning about action, causation is 
temporally directed. Hence in our work this distinction manifests itself in the fact 
that reasoning forwards in time is modelled as object-level deduction, whereas 
reasoning backwards in time is captured at the meta-level. The success of this 
approach lends extra weight to a developing consensus (see [8] for a general 
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discussion) that observations should somehow be treated separately from other 
aspects of theories of action. 
We have also shown how domains in ~ can be implemented in normal ogic 
programming with extended versions of Event Calculus programs that behave 
correctly even when the knowledge ntailed by the domain description is incom- 
plete. These programs have the capability of reasoning backwards as well as 
forwards in time. 
We can envisage at least three areas of future research relating to ~. First, in 
line with the methodology described in our introduction, we could use ~ as a 
"measuring stick" to show correspondences between various narrative-based for- 
malisms for reasoning about action, perhaps in the manner of Katha in [21]. 
Example candidates for comparison are the formalisms in [31], [34], [40] and [41]. 
Second, it would be interesting to investigate different styles of implementation 
as regards 8" domains. The approaches followed in this paper are based on a 
relatively simple use of normal ogic programming and standard techniques within 
this. We could develop a more general implementation for computing entailment 
or i-entailment using abductive logic programming, building on the work in [10], 
[11], [19], and [20]. The "abductive flavour" of our definition of h-entailment 
suggests that abductive logic programming could be a useful implementation tool 
here as well. 
Third, the expressivity of g~ could be increased in various ways. We have already 
briefly indicated how ~ might be extended to partially deal with ramifications and 
qualifications (see Appendix A). Since ~ already allows for actions to occur 
concurrently within a narrative, it seems likely that the language could also be 
extended to allow for a theory of cancelling and combined effects of actions imilar 
to that in [4]. It has already been pointed out [10], [12], [33] that a narrative based 
approach offers alternative ways to model non-deterministic effects of actions, and 
is a natural setting in which to model continuous change [39], [43], [32], [41]. Finally, 
we might extend the syntax and semantics of ~ to deal with incomplete informa- 
tion about the order and timing of action occurrences, perhaps building on the 
ideas in [10] and [12] and perhaps introducing temporal variables into the language 
in a manner similar to [5] and [6]. 
The utility and appeal of specialized eclarative languages such as 5~" and 8" lies 
in their simplicity. They are of sufficiently "high level" to allow various issues to be 
aired without immediately becoming involved in technical details, and are perhaps 
best regarded as useful stepping stones towards the ultimate goal of developing 
comprehensive formal theories of action using general purpose representational 
mechanisms. Hence their capacity for retaining their simplicity when extended to 
cover more complex domains is a crucial measure of their utility. 
APPENDIX A. EXTENDING THE EXPRESSIVITY OF 
Two extensions to the syntax and semantics of ~ are given in this appendix. This is 
in order to illustrate that the basic notion of a model, encapsulated in Definitions 
2.7 to 2.10, may be modified to accommodate extra types of propositions, without 
altering the basic principle of persistence captured in conditions (1)-(3) of Defini- 
tion 2.10. Both extensions are very simple, and although they are obviously related 
to aspects of the qualification problem and ramification problem respectively, it is 
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not our intention to suggest that, in this short space, we have developed a 
comprehensive approach to these subtle and complex issues. 
A. 1. Describing Conditions under Which an Action Cannot Occur 
In some circumstances it may be possible to infer knowledge about the conditions 
at the time of an action occurrence from the fact that the action did occur. For 
example, given that we know that "at 2 o'clock the caretaker unlocked the door," 
we might typically infer that (at 2 o'clock) "she had the key." This is because it is 
impossible to unlock a door without a key, which might be expressed by a 
proposition such as 
Unlock impossible-if { -7 HasKey}. 
This motivates a general definition for a new type of proposition: 
Definition A.1 [q-proposition]. A q-proposition in ~ is an expression of the form 
A impossible-if C 
where A ~ A, and C is a set of fluent literals of g~. 
Such propositions may be accommodated in the semantics of g" by strengthen- 
ing condition (4) of Definition 2.10 (which expresses imple pointwise constraints 
on a model), without changing in the basic notion of persistence ncapsulated in
conditions (1)-(3). Assuming that domain descriptions are now defined as a 
quadruple (3', 77,~,K), where y, 77 and r are as before, and K is a set of 
q-propositions, 11 the condition now becomes: 
(a) For all t-propositions in ~" of the form "F  holds-at T," H(F, T) = true, and 
for all t-propositions of the form "-7 F holds-at T," H(F, T) =false. 
(b) For all pairs of h-propositions and q-propositions in 77 × r of the form "A 
happens-at T"  and "A impossible-if C", H does not satisfy C at T. 
A.2. Describing Indirect Effects of  Actions 
The following extension to g~ is included to illustrate how Definition 2.9 of an 
initiation or termination point might be refined, without necessitating a change in 
the basic notion of persistence ncapsulated in conditions (1)-(3) of Definition 
2.10. Suppose that we wish to express imple constraints between fluents. To take a 
canonical example, suppose that we want to express that a room is stuffy when the 
window is closed and the ventilator blocked. This might be expressed by a 
proposition such as 
Stuffy whenever { Closed, Blocked}. 
Hence we define a new type of proposition as follows: 
Definition A.2 [r-proposition]. An r-proposition in ~ is an expression of the form 
L whenever C 
where L is a fluent literal and C is a set of fluent literals of ~. 
11 Note that, if for every c-proposition "A initiates F when C" there is a q-proposition "A 
impossible-if C U {F}," in any model all initiation points for F are actual points of change for F. An 
analogous observation holds for termination points. Thus Sergot's notions of strong initiation and strong 
termination [37] can be incorporated into ~ by addition of q-propositions where appropriate. 
190 A. KAKAS AND R. MILLER 
We now need a recursive definition of an initiation point and of a termination 
point, since, for example, if the ventilator is blocked, the action of closing the 
window will (indirectly) initiate the property of the room being stuffy. The modified 
definitions below assume that domain descriptions are defined as a tuple 
(y ,  r/, ~-, K, p),  where y, 77 and ~ are as before, K is a set of q-propositions and p is 
a set of r-propositions. 
Definition A.3 [Init iation/termination point for domains with r-propositions]. Let 
H be an interpretation of g', let D = (y ,  77, r, K, p)  be a domain description, let 
F ~ ~ and let T ~ II. T is an initiation-point (respectively termination-point) for 
F in H relative to D iff one of the following two conditions holds. 
1. There is an A ~ A such that (i) there is both an h-proposition in r/ of the 
form "A happens-at T" and a c-proposition in y of the form "A initiates F 
when C" (respectively "A terminates F when C") and (ii) H satisfies C at T. 
. There is an r-proposition in p of the 
"7  F whenever C") and a partition 
non-empty, for each fluent constant F'  
and for each fluent literal ~ F '  ~ Ca, T 
there is some T 2 ~ II, T -< T 2, such that 
at T 1. 
form "F  whenever C" (respectively 
{C1,C2} of C such that (i) C 1 is 
C1, T is an initiation point for F',  
is a termination point for F' ,  and (ii) 
for all T1, T ~ T 1 ~ T 2, H satisfies C 2 
Intuitively, condition (2) above states that in order find time points at which the 
fluent F becomes indirectly initiated via the r-proposition F whenever C, we need 
to look for points at which one or more of the conditions in C become satisfied, 
and at which the remaining conditions were already satisfied (and continue to be 
satisfied up to some point T 2 beyond the point in question). 
Condition (4) of Definition 2.10 is now: 
(a) For all t-propositions in • of the form "F  holds-at T," H(F,  T) = true, and 
for all t-propositions of the form "~ F holds-at T," H(F ,  T) =false. 
(b) For all pairs of h-propositions and q-propositions in ~/× K of the form "A 
happens-at T"  and "A impossible-if C," H does not satisfy C at T. 
(c) For all r-propositions in p of the form "L whenever C," if H satisfies C at T 
then H satisfies {L} at T. 
APPENDIX B. PROPOSITION PROOFS 
B. 1. P roof  o f  Proposition 2.1 
Proposition statement. Let D be an occurrence-sparse domain description written in a 
language ~ = ( H, ~ , A, ~ ) , and let T1, T 2 ~ II be such that T 1 ~ T 2. Let H and 
H'  be models of D such that for all F ~ cb, H(F,  T 1) = H'(F ,  T1). Then for all 
F ~ ~,  H(F ,  T 2) = H'(F,  T2). 
PROOF. Proof is by induction on the number n of h-propositions in r /o f  the form 
A happens-at T such that T 1 ~ T-< T 2. [] 
Base Case. If n = 0 then by the first condition in the definition of a model, for 
all F ~ ~,  H(F ,T  2) = H(F ,T] )  = H ' (F ,T  1) = H' (F ,  T2). 
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Inductive Step. Suppose that n > 0 and that the lemma is true for all m < n. Let 
F '~  qb be an arbitrary fluent constant. It is sufficient to show that H(F ' ,T  2) = 
H'(F' ,  7"2). Since D is occurrence-sparse there exists at least one T ~ I I  such that 
(i) T 1 ~ T-~ T 2, (ii) there is at least one h-proposition in r/ of the form "A 
happens-at T," and (iii) there is no h-proposition in 7/ of the form "A happens-at 
T '"  such that T-< T'-~ T 2. Let T h be such a time point. By the inductive 
hypothesis, for all F ~ cb, H(F,  T h) = H'(F,  T h) and by construction there are no 
initiation or termination points T' (for any fluent) in H or H '  such that T h -< T' -< 
T 2. There are three cases to consider (since in any model, F '  must be unaffected, 
initiated or terminated at Th). 
Case 1. There is not both an h-proposition in r/ of the form "A happens-at Th" 
and a c-proposition in y either of the form "A initiates F'  when C" or of the form 
"A terminates F' when C" such that H (and thus H ' )  satisfies C at T h. Hence by 
the first condition in the definition of a model, H(F',  T 2) = H(F' ,  T h) = H'(F' ,  T h) 
=H'(F' ,T2).  
Case 2. There is both an h-proposition in r /o f  the form "A happens-at Th" and a 
c-proposition in y of the form "A initiates F' when C" such that H (and thus H ' )  
satisfies C at T h. Hence by the second condition in the definition of a model, 
H( F',T 2) = true = H'( F', 7"2). 
Case 3. There is both an h-proposition in ~ of the form "A happens-at Th" and a 
c-proposition in y of the form "A terminates F' when C" such that H (and thus 
H ' )  satisfies C at T h. Hence by the third condition in the definition of a model, 
H(F', T2) =false = H'(F' ,  T2). 
B.2. Proof  o f  Proposition 5.1 
Proposition statement. Let D be an occurrence-sparse, non-converging, initially consis- 
tent, fluent-independent projection domain description. Then D is consistent. 
PROOF. Let D = (y ,  77, Ti )  be written in the projection language g' = (11, ~ ,  A, qb), 
and let T o be the null element of II. 
Let M : • ~ {true, false} be defined as follows. For each F ~ ~, 
• M(F)  = true if there is an i-proposition in r i of the form "initially F," 
° (F) =false otherwise. 
M will be used to construct a model H of D such that for all F ~ @, H(F,  T o) = 
M(F).  Notice that since D is initially consistent, then for each F ~ '~ such that 
there is an i-proposition in ri of the form "initially ~ F," M(F)  =false. [] 
Since D is occurrence-sparse and non-converging, each time point T ~ II has a 
unique, maximal, finite (possibly empty) sequence T1 . . . . .  T n associated with it such 
that T 1 -< --. -< T n -< T and such that for each T/ there is an h-proposition in r/ of 
the form "A happens-at T~." Moreover, the unique such sequence associated with 
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T n is T I , . . . ,  Tn_ 1. Therefore, it is possible to define an interpretation H of D 
inductively as follows. For each T ~ II and F ~ ~, 
1. H(F,  T)  = M(F)  if n = 0 (i.e., the sequence associated with T is empty). 
2. H(F,  T)  = H(F,  T n) if n > 0 and there is no A ~ A such that there is both an 
h-proposition in 7/ of the form "A happens-at Tn" and a c-proposition in y 
either of the form "A initiates F when C" or of the form "A terminates F 
when C" such that H satisfies C at T,. 
3. H(F ,T )=t rue  if n > 0 and there is an A ~ A such that there is both an 
h-proposition in 7/ of the form "A happens-at Tn" and a c-proposition in y 
of the form "A initiates F when C" such that H satisfies C at T~. 
4. H(F,  T)  =false if n > 0 and there is an A ~ A such that there is both an 
h-proposition in ~/ of the form "A happens-at Tn" and a c-proposition in 3' 
of the form "A terminates F when C" such that H satisfies C at T,. 
The fact that D is fluent-independent guarantees that no f luent/t ime-point pair 
(F, T) satisfies both of conditions 3 and 4 above. Hence H is well defined, and is 
clearly a model of D. 
B.3. Proof  o f  Proposition 6.1 
Proposition statement. Let D = (% r/, "ri) be an occurrence-sparse projection domain 
description and let "rob be an observation set. Then H is a model of ( 3", ~, "ri tO "rob) 
if and only if H is an i-model o lD  with "rob" 
PROOF. I_~t D written in the projection language g" = (H, ~ ,  A, ¢ ) ,  and let T o be 
the null element of II. 
" I f "  half: Suppose H is an i-model of D with "rob. Then by the definitions of a 
model and of an i-model there exists some set "ri, of i-propositions such that H is a 
model of (% '1, "ri ['-j Tie I.) "rob)" Hence, by the monotonicity of ~ as regards addition 
of t-propositions to domain descriptions (see the remarks at the end of Section 2), 
H is a model of (y ,  r/, % tO 'Fob ) .  
"Only if" half: Suppose H is a model of (% 71, "ri U "rob)" Let the set ~'H of 
i-propositions be defined as follows. For each F ~ ~,  
• initially F ~ "r/4 iff H(F,  T o) = true 
• initially -~ F ~ "rn iff H(F,  T o) =false. 
Clearly H is a model of (y ,  77, "rt U "r~/) and, by Proposition 2.1, (3', r/, % tO "r/4) ~P  
for each p ~ "rob, SO that "r/4 is an i-explanation for "rob in D. Hence H is an 
i-model of D with "rob" [] 
B. 4. Proof  o f  Proposition 7. 4 
Proposition statement. Let P( I I ,  ~)  be an ordering program for ~, and let D be a 
finite domain description. Then for any fluent literal L of g" and any T ~ II, if 
LP[D, e(n, HoldsAt(;t(L), T) 
then 
D ~ L holds-at T. 
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The proof of this proposition which is given below uses induction on the 
"length" length(a) of the SLDNF derivation a of HoldsAt( A( L ), T), where 
length(a) is defined in Definition B.1 below in terms of successful calls to 
HappensAt. It is defined so that each SLDNF sub-derivation of a HoldsAt sub-goal 
within a (which must have occurred within some call to Initiates, Terminates, 
Possib!ylnitiates or PossiblyTerminates) has "length" less than the top-level deriva- 
tion a. 
Definition B.1 [length(a)]. Let a be a successful SLDNF derivation of the goal 
HoldsAt(A(L), T) in LP[D, P(H,  ~)]. length(a) is defined inductively as follows: 
length(a) = S + Y'~ size(/3 ), 
~B~ 
where 
• S is the number of successful calls to HappensAt at the top level of a, i.e. 
not called within a (negation-as-failure) finite-failed subsidiary derivation 
of a. 
• B,, is the set of all finitely-failed subsidiary derivations from negative calls 
(to ClippedBetween or AffectedBetween) appearing at the top level of a. 
• size(/3) = 0 if there is no successful call to HappensAt in any branch of/3. 
• size(~3) = 1 + max({length(a')la' ~A~}) if there is a successful call to 
HappensAt inside /3, where A s is the set of all successful SLDNF 
derivations of a HoldsAt goal, called as a negated sub-goal in one of the 
branches of/3.12 
PROOF OF PROPOSmON. Let a be a successful SLDNF derivation of the goal 
HoldsAt(A(L), T) in LP[D, P(H,  ~)]. We will use induction on length(a) to show 
that, given the fixed point I + as defined in Proposition 7.3, if LP[D,P(H, ~)] 
~SLONF HoldsAt(A(L), T) then if L = F for some F ~ qb then I+(F, T) = true, and 
if L = ~ F'  for some F'  ~ • then I+(F ', T) =false. The proposition will then 
follow directly from Proposition 7.3. 
Base Case (length(a) = 0). Clearly, if length(a) = 0 the query HoldsAt( Pos( F ), T) 
[respectively HoldsAt(Neg(F'), T)] can succeed only on clauses (LPla), (LPlb) or 
(LP4), as success on (LP2) or (LP3) would require length(a) > 1. We consider each 
of these possibilities in turn: 
(i) Success on (LPla): Clearly, the success of Given(A(L),T 1) for some T 1 < T 
means that "L holds-at TI" ~D and so I+(F, T1)= true (respectively I+(F',T1)= 
false) by rule (4) in the definition of ~.  Also, since the call /3 to AffectedBetween 
fails with size(/3) = 0, the unground sub-goal HappensAt(a,t 2) fails, so that there 
are no h-propositions in D. Hence there are no possible initiation points or 
possible termination points between T 1 and T. Therefore, since I ÷ is a fixed point 
of ~,  rule ( la)  of .9 r applies to give I+(F, T) = true (respectively I+(F  ', T) =false). 
(ii) Success on (LPlb): The proof is exactly analogous to (i), but using rule ( lb) 
of 5r in place of rule (la). 
12 We assume the convention that max(~3) = O. 
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(iii) Success on (LP4): Trivially, I+(F ,T )= true (respectively I+(F' ,T)=false) 
by rule (4) in the definition of g.  
Inductive Step (length(a)= n). Suppose that the statement which we wish to 
prove is true for all SLDNF derivations a' of all HoldsAt goals such that 
length(a') < n. The query HoldsAt( Pos( F ), T) [respectively, HoldsAt( Neg( F' ), T )] 
can succeed only on clauses (LP4), (LPla), (LPlb) or (LP2) [respectively (LP3)]. 
Again, we consider each of these possibilities in turn: 
(i) Success on (LP4): Trivially, I+( F, T) = true [respectively I+( F ', T) =false] by 
rule (4) in the definition of ~. 
(ii) Success on (LPla): Since the sub-goals Giuen(A(L),tl),t 1 -<T succeed, 
I+(F,T1) = true (respectively, I+(F',T1)=false] by rule (4) in the definition of ~r 
(where T 1 is the binding to tl). It remains to show that there is no possible 
initiation point or possible termination point for F (respectively F')  between T~ 
and T, so that rule (la) in the definition of 9- may be applied. Trivially, if the 
sub-goals HappensAt(a, t2), 7"1 ~ t 2 and t 2 "< T in the body of each ClippedBetween 
clause collectively fail, there can be no such point. Now suppose these sub-goals 
succeed, binding t 2 to T 2. Since the call AffectedBetween(T 1, A(L), T 3) fails [so that 
the top level goal succeeds on clause (LPla)], both of the calls 
Possiblylnitiates(A, F, T 2) and PossiblyTerminates(A, F, T 2) (respectively Possi- 
blyTerminates(A, F', T 2) and Possiblylnitiates(A, F',T2)) fail. Hence, if there is a 
c-proposition i  D of the form "A initiates F when C" or "A terminates F when 
C" (respectively "A terminates F' when C" or "A initiates F' when C"], there is a 
fluent literal Lp ~ C such that not HoldsAt(h(Lp), T2) fails, i.e. HoldsAt(A(Lp), T2) 
succeeds, say with SLDNF derivation a', where length(d) < n. By the induction 
hypothesis, if L p = Fp then I + ( Fp, T 2) =false, and if L p = -1Fp then I + ( Fp, T z) = 
true. In either case, the c-proposition is therefore not applicable in the definition of 
a possible initiation point or possible termination point of F (respectively F') 
relative to I +. Hence rule (la) in the definition of 9-applies to give I+(F, T) = true 
(respectively I+( F ', T) =false) as required. 
(iii) Success on (LPlb): The argument in this case is exactly analogous to case 
(ii), but using rule (lb) [instead of rule (la)] in the definition of Y. 
(iv) Success on (LP2): In this case there exists a T 1 ~ 11, T 1 -< T, such that for 
some A ~ A the propositions "A happens-at TI" and "A initiates F when 
{L 1 . . . . .  Lk}" belong to D, and each of the calls HoldsAt(h(L1),T 0 . . . . .  
HoldsAt(h(Lk),T 1) succeed. The successful SLDNF derivations of each of these 
calls are of length strictly less than n due to the successful call of HappensAt(A, T~) 
in the root SLDNF derivation of HoldsAt(Pos(F),T). Hence by the inductive 
hypothesis, for each Li=Fi, I+(Fi, Tl)=true, and for each L j=  ~,  I+(Fj, T1) 
=false. Hence T 1 is an initiation point for F relative to I +. By an argument exactly 
analogous to that in case (ii) above, we can show from the finite failure of 
ClippedBetween(Tl, Pos(F), T) that there are no possible termination points for F 
between T~ and T, so that rule (2) in the definition of 3-appl ies to give 
I + ( F, T) = true as required. 
(v) Success on (LP3): The argument in this case is exactly analogous to case (iv), 
but using rule (3) [instead of rule (2)] in the definition of ~" to show that 
I+(F' ,T)  =false. [] 
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B.5. Proof of  Proposition 8.1 
Lemma B.1. Let ~ = ( I I ,  4 ,  A, ~)  be a fluent-finite, non-converging projection 
language, let P( I I ,  4 )  be an ordering program for ~, and let D = ( y,~,'r i) be a 
finite, initially-consistent, fluent-independent projection domain description in ~. 
Let H be a model of D. Let M be a ground list term such that the ground query 
Member(A, M) succeeds iff there is a fluent constant F' ~ • such that either 
A =Neg(F') and H(F',To)=false or A=F'  and H(F' ,T o) =true. Then for all 
F~ and T~H,  
EC[ D,f~, P( I I ,  4 ) ]  ~-SLOUF HoldsAt( M, Pos( F ) ,T )  
if and only if H(F, T) = true, and 
EC[D, f~,P( I I ,  4) ]  F-SLDN F HoldsAt( M, Ueg( F ) ,T )  
if and only if H(F, T) = false. 
PROOF. Let T and F be an arbitrary time-point and fluent constant. Since D is 
finite and non-converging, T has a unique, maximal, finite (possibly empty) se- 
quence T a . . . . .  T, associated with it such that T 1 -< ... -< T, ~ T and such that for 
each T~ there is an h-proposition in 77 of the form "A happens-at T~." Proof is by 
induction on the length n of this sequence. 
Base Case. Clearly, if n = 0 the queries HoldsAt(M, Pos(F),T) and Holds- 
At(M, Neg(F), T) can succeed only on clause (EC7), and will succeed if and only if 
the queries Member( Pos( F), M) and Member( Neg( F), M) succeed respectively. By 
the second condition in Definition 2.10 of a model, H(F, T)= H(F, To), so that by 
definition of the list term M the lemma is true in the base case. 
Inductive Step. Suppose that the lemma is true for all time-points whose associ- 
ated sequences are of length m < n. Then in particular it is true for T, whose 
associated sequence is of length n - 1. There are three cases to consider: 
Case 1. There is both an h-proposition in r? of the form "A happens-at Tn" and a 
c-proposition in y of the form "A initiates F when C" such that H satisfies C at 
Tn. Hence by the third condition in the definition of a model, H(F, T) = true. 
In this case, by the inductive hypothesis and the program definition of Initiates, 
the query HoldsAt(M, Pos(F), T) will succeed on clause (EC8) with the program 
variable tI in the body of the clause bound to T n. The query HoldsAt(M, Neg(F), T) 
will fail on clause (EC7) because the sub-goal ClippedBetween(M, To, Neg(F), T) 
will succeed on clause (EC l l )  with the program variable t 2 in the body of the 
clause bound to Tn. The query HoldsAt(M, Neg(F), T) will fail on clause (EC9) 
because by the inductive hypothesis and fluent-independence of D it will fail on 
the sub-goal Terminates(M, a F, T~) for all bindings of the variable a provided by 
solutions to Happens(a, T~). Hence in this case the lemma is true. 
Case 2. There is both an h-proposition in r/ of the form "A happens-at Tn" and a 
c-proposition in Y of the form "A terminates F when C" such that H satisfies C 
at T n. Hence by the third condition in the definition of a model, H(F, T)=false. 
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In this case, by the inductive hypothesis and the program definition of Initiates, 
the query HoldsAt(M, Neg(F), T) will succeed on clause (EC9) with the program 
variable tI in the body of the clause bound to Tn. The query HoldsAt(M, Pos(F), T) 
will fail on clause (EC7) because the sub-goal ClippedBetween(M, To Pos(F), T) 
will succeed on clause {EC10) with the program variable t 2 in the body of the 
clause bound to T,. The query HoldsAt(M, Pos(F), T) will fail on clause (EC8) 
because by the inductive hypothesis and fluent-independence of D it will fail on 
the sub-goal Initiates(M, a, F, T~) for all bindings of the variable a provided by 
solutions to Happens(a, T,). Hence in this case the lemma is also true. 
Case 3. There is not both an h-proposition in ~7 of the form "A happens-at Tn" 
and a c-proposition i  3' either of the form "A initiates F when C" or of the form 
"A terminates F when C" such that H satisfies C at Tn. Hence by the second 
condition in the definition of a model, H(F, T) = H(F, Tn). 
Clearly in this case, by the inductive hypothesis and by the program defini- 
tions of Initiates and Terminates, the queries HoldsAt(M, Pos(F),T) and 
HoldsAt(M, Neg(F), T) can succeed on the clauses (EC8) and (EC9) respectively 
only with the variable t 1 in the body of each clause bound to some time-point 
T i < T n. Moreover, by the same argument, for all T '<  T,, the queries Clipped- 
Between(M, T', Pos( F), T) and ClippedBetween( M, T', Neg( F), T) succeed if and 
only if the queries ClippedBetween( M, T', Pos( F), Tn) and ClippedBetween( M, T', 
Neg(F),T,) succeed respectively. Hence the queries HoldsAt(M, Pos(F), T) and 
HoldsAt(M, Neg(F), T) succeed if and only if the queries HoldsAt(M, Pos(F), T,) 
and HoldsAt(M, Neg(F), T,) succeed respectively. Hence in this case the lemma is 
also true. [] 
Statement of Main Proposition. Let g = (I I ,  .-<, A, • ) be a fluent-finite, nonconverg- 
ing projection language, let P(I I ,  ~)  be an ordering program for ~, and let 
D = (y, 77, ri ) be a finite, initially-consistent, fluent-independentprojection domain 
description i  g'. Let rob be a finite observation set. Then for any fluent literal L of 
~" and any T ~ II, 
EC[ D, roo,P(II, ~)]  ~SLDNF IHoldsAt( A( L ),T) 
if and only if 
D, rob ~i L holds-at T 
PROOF. Let an initial assignment of D be defined as a function M : • ~ {true, false} 
such that M(F)= true whenever there is an i-proposition in D of the form 
"initially F," and M(F)=false whenever there is an i-proposition in D of the 
form "initially ~ F." Since D is initially consistent there exists at least one such 
function, and by Propositions 2.1 and 5.1 there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between initial assignments of D and models of D. We may therefore unambigu- 
ously refer to the model H generated by the initial assignment M. 
Clearly, successive solutions to the sub-goals 
Setof( l, (Initially(l)), i), 
Setof( f , ( Fluent ( f ) ,  not Initially ( Pos ( f )  ), not Initially ( Neg ( f )  ) ), p ), 
Permutation( p, c), Append(e, i, m), 
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in clause (EC2) bind the variable m to an appropriate list representation f each 
such initial assignment in turn. Given such a ground list term M', by Lemma B.1, 
clause (EC6) and the definition of Forall, the goal 
ConsistentWithObsewations( M' ) 
will succeed if and only if the model of D its corresponding initial assignment 
generates i consistent with each o-proposition i  "rob. Hence successive solutions to 
the goal IExplanation(m) bind the variable m to a list representation f each initial 
assignment which generates an i-model of D with rob. Hence the proposition is 
true by clause (EC1), Lemma B.1 and the definition of Forall. 
APPENDIX C. AN ORDERING PROGRAM FOR (Ha, <a ) 
This appendix concerns the practical details of implementing Language ~ domains 
as Event Calculus style Prolog programs in the manner of Section 8, given the 
intermediate ranslations to ~ domain descriptions as defined in Section 3. 
The following ordering program P(IIa, <a ) uses the Situation Calculus style 
terms 
Result( A,, Result( .... Result( A1, SO)... )) 
and 
Branch( A', Result(An, Result(..., Result( A1, SO)... ))) 
to represent the A-sequences "A 1 . . . . .  An" and "A 1 . . . . .  A n, ]A'[" respectively: 
tl "<a t2 ~ ListForm(t2,12), Append([h [r], 11,12), ListForm(tl, 11). 
t~at. 
tl ~a t2 ~- tl "<A t2. 
ListForm(SO, [ ]). 
ListForm( Branch( a, t), [ B( a)[l  ] ) ~ ListForm( t, l). 
ListForm( Result( a, t), [ R(a) ,  B ( a) I I ] ) ,-- ListForm( t, 1). 
In addition, the complete occurrence set of A is represented by a single clause 
which replaces all the domain-dependent ground HappensAt clauses of Definition 
8.2: 
HappensAt( a, Branch( a, t) ). 
The important feature of the above ordering program is that not only does it 
correctly deal with ground queries of the form "T ~ T'" (where T and T' are 
Situation Calculus style representations of A-sequences as described above), but it 
also gives all correct solutions to queries of the form "t ~ T'" (where t is a 
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variable). This enables the sub-goals in clauses (EC8) - (EC l l )  to be re-ordered as 
follows: 
HoldsAt( m, Pos( f ), t3) ~- 
t 1 < t3, HappensAt(a, t 1 ), Initiates( m, a, f ,  t 1 ), 
not ClippedBetween( m,t,, Pos( f ), t 3). 
(EC8' )  
HoldsAt( m, Neg( f ), t3) 
t I -< t3, HappensAt(a, t~), Terminates(m, a, f ,  t 1), 
not ClippedBetween( m,t I ), Neg ( f ) ,  t 3 ). 
( IE9 ' )  
ClippedBetween( m,t 1 , Pos ( f ) ,  t 3 ) 
t 2 -< t3, t 1 ~ t2, HappensAt( a, t 2), Terminates( m, a, f ,  t 2). 
(EC10' )  
ClippedBetween( m,t 1 , Neg( f ), t 3 ) 4-- 
t 2 ~< t3, t a ~ t2, Happens( a, t 2 ), Initiates(m, a, f ,  t 2). 
(EClr) 
This reordering avoids problems that would otherwise arise from calls to 
HappensAt with an unground second argument. 
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